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ABSTRACT
Starting with its illustration in the Apocrypha and continuing into
the modern day both in courtrooms and in ubiquitous criminal
procedurals, one evidence rule has proven so powerful that it has
become known as “THE” Rule of Evidence. The rule of witness
sequestration demands that multiple witnesses to the same events be
examined separately from one another to prevent them from, consciously or subconsciously, tailoring their testimony to ensure that it
remains consistent. Witness sequestration is conceptually simplistic
and famously mighty. Yet, this bedrock protection against inaccurate
trial testimony is imperiled by conflicting interpretations of Federal
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Rule of Evidence 615, the Rule that provides sequestration protection
in federal court. In some circuits, the Rule is narrowly construed in
accordance with its plain language to prohibit witnesses only from
remaining physically present in the courtroom during testimony.
Under this view, the Rule offers no protection against testimonial
tailoring outside the courtroom. Yet, remaining physically present
during the testimony of other witnesses is not the only means by
which a prospective witness might adapt her testimony to match that
of other witnesses. Although extra-tribunal witness coordination has
always been possible, the explosion in technology and the recent
specter of COVID-19 have multiplied exponentially options for testimonial tailoring beyond the courtroom doors. For this reason, some
circuits construe terse “Rule 615” orders broadly to prohibit witness
collaboration and access to testimony beyond the trial setting.
Although these circuits afford the full complement of sequestration
protection, their expansive construction of succinct “Rule 615” orders
generates fairness concerns about inadequate notice of proscribed
witness behavior. This Article details the competing interpretations
of Rule 615 orders adopted by the federal courts and examines the
merits and demerits of each approach. It further elucidates the philosophical divide reflected in the circuit split, exposing the textualist
and purposive theories of rule construction animating the opposing
views. The Article ultimately proposes detailed alternatives for revising Rule 615, offering draft language that could be adopted to
memorialize either of the federal approaches to witness sequestration
in amended rule text.
“[S]equestration is (next to cross-examination) one of the greatest
engines that the skill of man has ever invented for the detection
of liars in a court of justice.” 1

1. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 1838 (Arthur Best ed., 4th ed. 2021).
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INTRODUCTION
Starting with its illustration in the Apocrypha and continuing
into the modern day both in courtrooms and in ubiquitous criminal
procedurals, one evidence rule has proven so powerful that it has
become known as “THE” Rule of Evidence.2 The rule of witness
sequestration demands that multiple witnesses to the same events
be examined separately from one another to prevent them from,
consciously or subconsciously, tailoring their testimony to ensure
that it remains consistent.3
Suppose that a defendant is on trial for arson in federal court.4 He
claims that he was innocently walking by the building in question
when he heard an explosion and ran from the fire. But the government has two witnesses—friends who were originally detained as
suspects in the arson investigation after they were found together
in the vicinity of the burning building. These two witnesses quickly
implicated the defendant and offered to cooperate with the prosecution, claiming that they observed the defendant running out of the
building shortly before it erupted in flames. Their testimony will be
critical to the defendant’s fate. The defendant moves to sequester
the government witnesses until they testify at trial, and the court
states, “Yes, I am invoking the Rule. All government and defense
witnesses shall be excluded from trial until they testify.” The first
government eyewitness testifies and gives a detailed account of
when and where he spotted the defendant running from the
building. Consistent with the trial court’s sequestration order, the
second witness is not present in court during this testimony. After
the court recesses for the evening, however, the first eyewitness
texts his friend and describes his testimony in detail. The next day,
the friend testifies, adhering closely to the details provided in the
text.

2. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & LIESA L. RICHTER, EVIDENCE
§ 6.71 (6th ed. 2018) (“In courtroom parlance, excluding or sequestering witnesses is known
as invoking ‘the rule on witnesses.’”).
3. See 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 615.03 (12th ed. 2019).
4. Assume the hypothetical defendant is charged under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
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Has there been a violation of the rule of witness sequestration? In
many jurisdictions, the answer is yes because one witness communicated the substance of his trial testimony to another excluded
witness, enabling him to tailor his testimony.5 In many others, there
is no violation of the witness sequestration rule simply because both
government witnesses remained physically absent from the courtroom during the trial.6 In these jurisdictions, testimonial tailoring
is permissible notwithstanding the trial court’s invocation of “the
Rule”—so long as it occurs beyond the courtroom doors.7
The principle of witness sequestration or separation ensures
accurate fact finding by enabling litigants to uncover deception or
error revealed by distinctions among witness accounts.8 The credibility of the key testimony given by the government witnesses in the
illustration above would have been seriously undermined had they
offered differing descriptions of the man they saw running from the
building or varying versions of the time and place at which they observed him. For this reason, American courts have long recognized
the importance of witness sequestration to the fair operation of trial
proceedings: “it will make available the raw reactions and the
individual recollection of each witness unaided by the stimulation
of the evidence of any other witness.”9
Witness sequestration is, thus, conceptually simplistic and
famously mighty. Perhaps due to its time-honored pedigree and universal acceptance, sequestration is somewhat taken for granted—
commonly invoked at the inception of hearings or trial proceedings
with only a brief reference to “the Rule” or a court order of “separation” or “sequestration.”10 Once the Rule has been invoked, lawyers
know that prospective witnesses—with a few notable exceptions—
must exit the courtroom until called to testify.11 Federal Rule of
5. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2018); United
States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1993).
7. Id.
8. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1838.
9. Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1962); see also Queen City
Brewing Co. v. Duncan, 42 F.R.D. 32, 33 (D. Md. 1966) (“Defendants’ purpose in seeking the
order is to secure the independent recollection of each deponent without that recollection
having been influenced, properly or improperly, by the depositions previously taken.”).
10. See, e.g., OHIO R. EVID. 615 staff note to 2003 amendment.
11. See id.
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Evidence 615 sets forth the right to sequestration applicable in
federal proceedings.12 Consistent with its common law ancestors,
Rule 615 demands that testifying witnesses be “excluded” from a
trial or hearing upon request so that they cannot “hear” the
testimony of other witnesses.13
Remaining physically present during the testimony of other
witnesses is, of course, not the only means by which a prospective
witness might adapt her testimony to match that of other witnesses.
Prospective witnesses might coordinate outside of the trial proceeding prior to testifying. Or a witness who has already given
testimony might communicate the substance of her testimony to an
upcoming witness during a recess in the proceedings, as exemplified
by the illustration above. As technology has advanced, the potential
methods available for extra-tribunal access to trial testimony have
multiplied exponentially. A witness might email, text, or tweet
about the content of her testimony. Daily trial transcripts can be
churned out at warp speed, providing prospective witnesses with a
real-time window into court proceedings.14 Moreover, the recent
specter of COVID-19 has spawned new and creative methods for
trying cases and holding hearings in a socially distanced manner—and these new methods can provide new ways to access trial
testimony.15 Now, a prospective witness might obtain the Zoom invitation to a virtual trial proceeding and listen in on daily testimony.
Some districts have posted trial proceedings on YouTube for anyone
to watch.16 Or a prospective witness might enter a courtroom into
which remote trial proceedings are being streamed to maintain
distance among trial participants.
Witness exclusion from trial proceedings utterly fails to provide
the important safeguard against testimonial tailoring if prospective
witnesses are permitted to access trial testimony from outside the
courtroom. Indeed, in the famous case of Sheppard v. Maxwell,17 the
12. FED. R. EVID. 615.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., What is Realtime?, NAT’L CT. REPS. ASS’N, http://ncra.org/home/professionals_resources/professional-advantage/captioning/realtime [https://perma.cc/L5KU-2J3Q].
15. See, e.g., Mia Armstrong, Justice, Livestreamed, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2020, 12:09 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/zoom-courts-livestream-youtube.html [https://perma.cc/
5GQN-ZGLU].
16. Id.
17. See Sam Sheppard, the Inspiration for “The Fugitive,” Dies, HISTORY (Sept. 8, 2020),
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Supreme Court recognized that witness sequestration is undermined when prospective witnesses are given access to the content
of trial testimony:
[T]he court should have insulated the witnesses. All of the newspapers and radio stations apparently interviewed prospective
witnesses at will, and in many instances disclosed their testimony. A typical example was the publication of numerous
statements by Susan Hayes, before her appearance in court,
regarding her love affair with Sheppard. Although the witnesses
were barred from the courtroom during the trial the full verbatim
testimony was available to them in the press. This completely
nullified the judge’s imposition of the rule.18

For this reason, several federal circuits hold that a trial judge’s
invocation of Rule 615 not only requires the physical exclusion of
prospective witnesses from the courtroom, but also operates automatically to preclude witnesses from accessing or being provided
trial testimony while they remain outside of court.19 These courts
emphasize the fundamental purpose of sequestration and an interpretation of Rule 615 that allows litigants to realize the full and
intended benefit of a witness sequestration order.20 Without such
protection beyond the courtroom doors, these courts posit that the
time-honored and fundamental sequestration right becomes a dead
letter.21
Not all federal courts interpret Rule 615 so broadly. Several circuits have adopted a textualist or plain language approach to the
meaning and scope of Rule 615.22 In these federal courts, an order
entered under “Rule 615” accomplishes only what the terminology
chosen for the Rule describes: the physical exclusion of prospective

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/sam-sheppard-dies [https://perma.cc/W4Y5-CTUC]
(noting that the sensational trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard was rumored to have inspired the
television series and movie THE FUGITIVE).
18. 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966) (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2018) (“An exclusion order would mean little if a prospective witness could simply read a transcript of prior
testimony he was otherwise barred from hearing.”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993).

8

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:001

witnesses from the courtroom.23 These courts highlight the notice
problem created by an expansive interpretation of orders entered
under Rule 615 that proscribes extra-tribunal witness conduct not
covered in the language of the Rule.24 According to these circuits,
punishing litigants or witnesses for transgressing unexpressed restrictions on their conduct outside the courtroom raises problems of
fundamental fairness.25 Thus, in the circuits adopting a plain language interpretation of Rule 615, trial courts must do more than
invoke Rule 615 to extend protection beyond the courtroom doors;
they must enter specific orders detailing the precise witness conduct
that they intend to limit.26 In these jurisdictions, our hypothetical
arson defendant’s conviction would not be subject to attack, even
though the second key witness against him received trial testimony.
Accordingly, there is a divide among the federal courts about the
import of an order entered pursuant to Rule 615 that threatens the
fundamental sequestration right as well as the uniform application
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The sequestration protection enjoyed by litigants in one federal circuit differs sharply from that
enjoyed by litigants in another operating under an identical district
court order. And neither approach to trial court orders entered under the existing language of Rule 615 is satisfactory. The textualist
approach to Rule 615 allows witnesses to obtain trial testimony
freely so long as they do so outside the courtroom. The broader purposive approach to the Rule gives litigants and witnesses inadequate notice of the restrictions on witness conduct and access to
testimony outside of court. Although this conflict and the threat it
poses to the fundamental right of witness sequestration have
persisted for many years, no progress has been made in the courts
toward harmonizing and unifying the approach to Rule 615.27 This
is not surprising given the irreconcilable tension between the
limited text of Rule 615 and its broader purpose. The inherent
problem with Rule 615 can be rectified only by an amendment that
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1176-77.
25. See id. at 1177.
26. Id. at 1176.
27. See Sarah Chapman Carter, Comment, Exclusion of Justice: The Need for a Consistent
Application of Witness Sequestration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, 30 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 63, 90 (2004) (arguing that federal courts should uniformly apply the expansive approach
to sequestration that limits witness access to testimony outside the courtroom).
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clarifies the full scope of a federal court’s sequestration order and
extends the power outside the courtroom.28
Part I of this Article briefly traces the history of witness sequestration and of Federal Rule of Evidence 615. Part II details the
competing interpretations of Rule 615 orders adopted by the federal courts and examines the merits and demerits of each approach.
Part II further elucidates the philosophical divide reflected in the
circuit split, exposing the textualist and purposive theories of rule
construction animating the opposing views. Part III explores the
application of sequestration protections outside the confines of the
courtroom, to counsel preparing witnesses and the competing federal approaches to attorney regulation. Part IV highlights yet
another Rule 615 circuit split, this one over the number of testifying
witnesses permitted to remain in the courtroom, notwithstanding
a sequestration order, as designated representatives of entity parties. Part IV illustrates the importance of repairing minor flaws in
a federal rule that may not justify a rule revision in their own right
when proposing other, more weighty amendments. Finally, Part V
gets down to brass tacks and proposes detailed alternatives for
revising Rule 615, offering draft language that could be adopted to
memorialize either of the federal approaches to witness
sequestration in rule text. We close with a discussion of the
comparative merits of each of the two proposals.
I. “THE” RULE: A BRIEF HISTORY
Sequestration of witnesses is one of the oldest and most time-honored staples of the trial process. As noted above, Dean John Henry
Wigmore famously described sequestration as “one of the greatest
engines that the skill of man has ever invented for the detection of

28. Such an amendment has been approved by the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules and has been released for public comment. See Comm. on Rules
of Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Con. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, and the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Request for Comment 2 (2021) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments], https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/proposed-amendments-publishedpublic-comment [https://perma.cc/2F78-8RGZ]. If ultimately approved, the amendment would
go into effect on December 1, 2023. Id. at 3. The Advisory Committee’s proposal will be
discussed below.
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liars in a court of justice,” second only to cross-examination.29
Sequestration of witnesses is critical to ensuring that the allimportant confrontation of witnesses is meaningful.30 The trademark of successful cross-examination is striking while the iron is
hot and before a witness has an opportunity to anticipate a line of
inquiry or attack.31 Ensuring that witnesses are sequestered so they
are unable to shape their testimony to accommodate that of other
witnesses furthers meaningful cross-examination and effective
truth-seeking.32 Cross-examination of separated witnesses that reveals significant variation in their versions of the same event may
powerfully undermine their testimony.
Witness sequestration may be known as “THE” Rule of Evidence
due to its Biblical origins. As told in the book of Daniel, two elders
accused Susanna of adultery.33 Both claimed to see her committing
adultery under the shade of a tree.34 Suspecting that the elders
falsely accused Susanna, Daniel ordered separate examinations,
with the second elder excluded from the tribunal while the first one
testified.35 When asked to provide details regarding the incident and
the tree in question, the elders differed in their accounts.36 The tribunal acquitted Susanna and beheaded the elders for giving false
testimony.37 Such is the power of sequestration.
In Geders v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that
witness sequestration dates back to “our inheritance of the common
Germanic law,” and that it serves two purposes: “[i]t exercises a
restraint on witnesses ‘tailoring’ their testimony to that of earlier
witnesses; and it aids in detecting testimony that is less than

29. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1838.
30. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-44 (2004) (tracing history of Sixth Amendment confrontation right and its importance as a procedural guarantee).
31. See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 2, § 6.62 (“Cross-examination is so highly regarded
as a mechanism for testing the meaning and limits of testimony ... that it is considered a
fundamental right.”).
32. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1838.
33. Apocrypha, in THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE 1548, 1550 (Michael D. Coogan,
ed., 4th ed. 2020); see also Daniel 13:36-64 (Douay-Rheims 1899 American Edition); WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 1837 (quoting the Apocrypha).
34. Daniel 13:36-64.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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candid.”38 Under pre-Rules practice, witness sequestration was
discretionary with the trial judge.39 As sequestration’s greatest
champion, Dean Wigmore strongly advocated making sequestration
mandatory upon request, arguing that it would be the parties, and
not the judge, who would be aware of the risk of tailoring—a risk
that might not be easily described to the judge.40 Exclusion is
“simple and feasible” and “powerful and practical,” so no contingency justifies denying it.41 If perjury is contemplated, exclusion is
“almost the only hope,” and nobody, including judges, can know
whether exclusion is actually needed; a party who thinks he needs
it “must be allowed to have the benefit of the chance.”42
When witness sequestration was enshrined in Federal Rule of
Evidence 615, the drafters adopted the mandatory approach urged
by Wigmore, noting that:
The efficacy of excluding or sequestering witnesses has long
been recognized as a means of discouraging and exposing fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. The authority of the judge is
admitted, the only question being whether the matter is committed to his discretion or one of right. The rule takes the latter
position.43

In its current form, Rule 615 reads as follows:
At a party’s request, the court must order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony. Or the court
may do so on its own. But this rule does not authorize excluding:
(a)

a party who is a natural person;

38. 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1837); see also Perry v.
Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1989) (“[W]itnesses may be sequestered to lessen the danger
that their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to
increase the likelihood that they will confine themselves to truthful statements based on
their own recollections.”).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting that the
matter of sequestration “rests within the discretion of the trial judge”).
40. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1839.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s note (citation omitted).
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(b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural
person, after being designated as the party’s representative by
its attorney;
(c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to
presenting the party’s claim or defense; or
(d)

a person authorized by statute to be present.44

Under this provision, sequestration is mandatory upon request, and
a trial judge may order witnesses excluded sua sponte.45
The Rule contains three mandatory exceptions to exclusion. First,
it permits a party who is a natural person to remain in the courtroom.46 “Excluding such a person would raise questions of fundamental fairness and, in criminal cases, constitutional issues relating
to confrontation and effective assistance of counsel.”47 Second, the
Rule requires an exemption for the designated representative of a
party that is not a natural person.48 This exemption is designed to
create “parity of treatment” for parties that are not natural persons
and that may require the assistance and support of a party agent
during trial.49 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 615 justifies
the exemption for a party’s designated agent “[a]s the equivalent of
the right of a natural-person party to be present.”50 If entities did
not have an absolute right to designate an agent, they would have
a disadvantage as compared to individual litigants.51 “[T]he courts
44. FED. R. EVID. 615. Rule 615 was restyled in 2011, implementing stylistic, but not
substantive, changes to the Rule. FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s note to 2011
amendment.
45. See United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The rule
codified a well-established common law tradition of sequestering witnesses ‘as a means of
discouraging and exposing fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.’”) (citing United States v.
Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1995)).
46. FED. R. EVID. 615(a).
47. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:109 (4th
ed. 2020).
48. FED. R. EVID. 615(b).
49. FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s note.
50. Id.
51. Tellingly, the committee note states that “[m]ost of the cases have involved allowing
a police officer who has been in charge of an investigation to remain in court despite the fact
that he will be a witness.” Id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing conflict in the case law on the
number of witnesses that can be automatically excluded under Rule 615(b)).
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have applied the exception to an FBI agent, a postal inspector, a
DEA agent, and state or local police officers. Of course, the exception
also applies to officers or employees of other parties that are not
natural persons, such as corporations.”52 Finally, the mandatory sequestration exemption for persons authorized to remain in the
courtroom by statute53 was added to Rule 615 in 1998 after Congress
passed protections for victims in criminal cases, permitting them to
view trial proceedings.54
In addition to these three mandatory exemptions from sequestration, Rule 615 provides the trial judge discretion to permit any
witness “whose presence a party shows to be essential” to remain in
the courtroom.55 Although this discretionary exemption may apply
to any witness so long as the party makes the requisite showing of
essentiality, it has been applied most commonly to expert witnesses
and to case agents in criminal cases.56
Witness sequestration during a hearing or trial is thus conceptually simplistic and its importance is uniformly accepted. Perhaps
because of sequestration’s uncontroversial application and historical acceptance, trial courts routinely issue sequestration orders that
are short and sweet.57 Trial courts commonly invoke “the Rule” or
“Rule 615” or order witnesses “sequestered” orally on the record
without elaborating on the specific scope of their orders.58 The Ohio
Advisory Committee described the process as follows:
In practice, it is most common for trial courts to enter highly
abbreviated orders on the subject. Normally a party will move
for the “separation” (or “exclusion”) of witnesses, and the court
will respond with a general statement that the motion is granted. This is usually followed by an announcement to the gallery
52. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6245 (2d ed. 2016) (citations omitted).
53. FED. R. EVID. 615(d).
54. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 52, § 6245 (noting that the Oklahoma City bombing trial
of Timothy McVeigh sparked congressional concern over the rights of victims to be present
in the courtroom); see also the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3) (2020).
55. FED. R. EVID. 615(c).
56. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, § 6:109 (“Experts are perhaps the most likely
candidates for this exemption, since Rule 703 lets experts testify to opinions or inferences
based on facts or data made known to the expert by observing a trial or hearing.”).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993).
58. See id.
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that prospective witnesses should leave the courtroom and by a
statement that the parties are responsible for policing the
presence of their own witnesses. Though some courts then orally
announce additional limitations on communications to or by
witnesses, the far more usual approach is simply to assume that
the generic order of “separation” adequately conveys whatever
limitations have been imposed.59

Importantly, Rule 615 does not address expressly the many forms
of witness conduct outside the courtroom that could enable witnesses to tailor their testimony. The plain language of the Rule
references only physically “excluding” witnesses from the courtroom
proper so that they cannot “hear” the testimony of other witnesses.60
But witnesses clearly may tailor their testimony one to another
without physically sitting in the courtroom during trial. Witnesses
may read daily transcripts of a trial,61 be housed together in the
same cell or share transportation to and from the courthouse,62 or
simply chat about their testimony over lunch or in the hallways of
the courthouse.63 As noted above, COVID-19 restrictions forced trial
courts to experiment with new processes that allow for virtual
witness testimony.64 These new processes may increase exponentially the possibility of access to trial testimony by prospective
witnesses. A witness may obtain a Zoom link to a virtual trial and
listen in from the comfort of home.65 Some courts stream trial
testimony from one courtroom into others to allow for greater social
59. OHIO R. EVID. 615 staff note to 2003 amendment.
60. FED. R. EVID. 615.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2018).
62. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1175.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Binetti, 547 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d on rehearing
on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1977).
64. See, e.g., In re RFC & ResCap Liquidating Tr. Action, 444 F. Supp. 3d 967, 970-71 (D.
Minn. 2020) (finding that the global pandemic created good cause for remote testimony in ongoing civil trial and that the court’s discretion to order remote testimony is supplemented by
its “wide latitude” in determining the manner in which evidence is presented under Rule
611(a)).
65. Bonnie Eslinger, McDermott Faces SRA Review After Sharing Trial Zoom Link,
LAW360 (Aug. 6, 2020, 7:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/
1299010?utm_source=shared-articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles
[https://perma.cc/ZT2H-MMBZ] (“McDermott Will & Emery LLP ... [mistakenly allowed] a
restricted Zoom link for its client’s trial ... to be distributed to individuals outside of the
case.”).
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distancing of participants.66 A sequestered witness, though absent
from the primary courtroom, may access the testimony in another
courtroom through a live stream.67
When trial courts simply invoke “The Rule,” federal appellate
courts differ sharply over whether the order regulates such witness
conduct beyond physical exclusion from the courtroom. This
disagreement generated a circuit split about the foundational
sequestration right among the federal courts.
II. CONSTRUING RULE 615: STRICT VS. EXPANSIVE CONSTRUCTION
As noted above, trial court sequestration orders are notoriously
succinct. Judges frequently invoke “The Rule” or order witnesses
“sequestered” pursuant to Rule 615.68 Some circuits limit Rule 615
to its plain meaning and interpret terse Rule 615 orders only to
prohibit witnesses from remaining physically present in the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses.69 Others interpret
Rule 615 orders more expansively to limit witness interaction and
access to testimony beyond the courtroom doors.70 Lurking beneath
this conflict is the age-old debate regarding a “textual” or “plain
language” approach to statutory and rule construction, as opposed
to a “purposive” reading of statutory and rule text that gives effect
to the legislative intent and policy underlying the plain language.
A. The Plain Language Approach
Rule 615 mandates that trial judges “order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.”71 Some circuits
take the Rule at its word and find that a Rule 615 order requires
only that witnesses be physically excluded from the courtroom.72
Under this view, a Rule 615 order does not prevent witnesses from
66. Minutes from the Evid. Advisory Comm. Meeting 17 (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.
uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-evidence-rulesnovember-2020 [https://perma.cc/UP63-MAQW].
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., United States v. McMahon, 104 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 1997).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2018).
71. FED. R. EVID. 615 (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2003).
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talking to each other about testimony outside the courtroom and
does not prevent a prospective witness from obtaining the courtroom
testimony of another witness.73 These courts acknowledge the trial
judge’s common law authority to extend sequestration protections
to witness behavior outside the courtroom.74 To extend protections
beyond the courtroom in these plain language circuits, however, a
trial judge must do more than invoke “the Rule” or order “sequestration.” She must enter a specific court order describing regulation of
witness conduct beyond the courtroom.75
This restrictive view of Rule 615 orders is well-illustrated by the
First Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Sepulveda.76 In Sepulveda,
the defendants were charged with participation in a drug trafficking
conspiracy.77 Prior to trial, defendants moved for sequestration of
witnesses.78 In granting the motion, the trial court directed counsel
to “monitor sequestration” and ordered that “witnesses who are
subject to [the court’s] order are not to be present in the courtroom
at any time prior to their appearance to render testimony.”79 After
they were convicted, the defendants argued that the government
violated the sequestration order by housing three key prosecution
witnesses in a single cell throughout the trial, allowing them to
share testimony shortly after testifying.80
The First Circuit held that the government had not violated the
trial court’s “basic sequestration order” by housing key witnesses
together.81 According to the court, the trial court’s sequestration
order “ploughed a straight furrow in line with Rule 615 itself, [and]
did not extend beyond the courtroom.”82 In so holding, the First
Circuit explained that “the common law supported sequestration beyond the courtroom,” but “Rule 615 contemplates a smaller reserve;
by its terms, courts must ‘order witnesses excluded’ only from the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1978).
See id.
15 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (1st Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1176.
Id.
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courtroom proper.”83 The court acknowledged that trial judges
possess the common law power to innovate “beyond the perimeters
of that which the rule explicitly requires,” but found that the
defendants had not requested “any specific extra-courtroom prophylaxis” and that the trial judge’s Rule 615 order did not afford any
relief beyond the physical exclusion from the courtroom mandated
by the plain language of the Rule.84
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit traditionally interprets Rule 615
orders narrowly to restrict only the physical courtroom presence of
a witness.85 In United States v. Collins, the court held that the
government had not violated a Rule 615 sequestration order by
placing two trial witnesses in the same holding cell before either
had testified.86 In United States v. Smith, the court found that a
nontestifying police officer had not violated the district court’s Rule
615 order when he “took notes throughout the trial and relayed this
information to government witnesses waiting to testify.”87 Most
recently, in United States v. Collier, a defendant convicted of sex
trafficking argued that the government had violated the district
court’s Rule 615 order when one government witness talked to
another government witness during a break in the latter’s direct
testimony.88 Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court explained that “‘sequestration orders ... do not forbid all contact with
all trial witnesses at all times,’ unless otherwise specified.”89
83. Id. at 1175-76.
84. Id. at 1176.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Engelmann, 701 F.3d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 2012) (Gruender,
J., dissenting); United States v. Calderin-Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 977, 984-85 (8th Cir. 2001)
(“[Rule 615] does not by its terms forbid an attorney from conferring with witnesses during
trial.”).
86. 340 F.3d 672, 681 (8th Cir. 2003).
87. 578 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1978).
88. 932 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2019).
89. Id. (quoting Engelmann, 701 F.3d at 877). The Eighth Circuit opinion in Engelmann
reveals confusion even within the Circuit about the proper scope of a Rule 615 order. In that
case, the majority held that “it would be illogical to hold that [the witness], excluded from the
courtroom pursuant to a sequestration order, could wait outside the courtroom doors and then
discuss with [another witness] the testimony which [the other witness] had just given.” 701
F.3d at 878. The dissent in Engelmann took the majority to task for ignoring the narrow
interpretation of a Rule 615 order in the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 879 (Gruender, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing to assess prejudice to the defendant
resulting from a conversation between two government witnesses outside the courtroom
because “neither Rule 615 nor the district court’s sequestration order prohibited such out-of-
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Recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
also articulated a narrow view of Rule 615 consistent with its plain
language.90 In that case, a defendant was prosecuted for bank and
wire fraud.91 At the beginning of trial, defense counsel made a
specific sequestration request: “when a potential witness has yet to
testify, ... they can’t sit in the room to hear other witnesses, or
opening statements, or something of that nature.”92 The district
court granted the defense request and the government’s parallel
request.93 Toward the end of the trial, defense counsel learned that
a prosecutor and a case agent, who was also a witness that the
defense expressed intent to call, spoke with another government
witness about communications the witness had with the case
agent.94 After his conviction, the defendant sought a new trial,
arguing that this communication between witnesses outside the
courtroom violated the court’s Rule 615 sequestration order.95
Rejecting the defense’s sequestration objection, the district court
noted the lack of clarity in the circuit courts with respect to the
purview of Rule 615.96 Stating that the Second Circuit has not
extended a Rule 615 order beyond the courtroom, the district court
found that the out-of-court communication did not violate the
language of Rule 615 or defense counsel’s specific sequestration
request, both of which referenced physical absence from the
courtroom only.97 Like the First and Eighth Circuits, the district

court contact”). The Third Circuit follows a similar approach. See United States v. Brown, 547
F.2d 36, 37 (3d Cir. 1976) (refusing to sequester witnesses during opening statements because
the plain language of Rule 615 relates only to the time of “testimony”).
90. United States v. Teman, 465 F. Supp. 3d 277, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
91. Id. at 299.
92. Id. at 321.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 324-25.
96. Id. at 322 (“While the purpose of [Rule 615] is apparent, its purview is not.”) (quoting
United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 592 (6th Cir. 2003)).
97. Id. at 325. As will be discussed infra, the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988), could be read to foreclose out-of-courtroom communication of testimony to witnesses. See infra notes 131, 135 and accompanying text. The
district court in Teman acknowledged Friedman but read it only to afford the district court’s
discretion to extend sequestration orders beyond the courtroom. Teman, 465 F. Supp. 3d at
324 n.32, 326.
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court clearly favored a narrow reading of Rule 615 in keeping with
its plain language.98
B. An Expansive Reading of Rule 615
Most circuits reject the plain meaning approach and interpret
Rule 615 orders more broadly to preclude witness access to testimony outside the courtroom doors. These circuits emphasize Rule
615’s fundamental purpose—to prevent witnesses from coordinating their trial testimony in order to preserve the integrity of the
truth-seeking process.99 Dean Wigmore, evidence titan and enthusiastic advocate of sequestration, supported just such a comprehensive approach to sequestration.100 Wigmore opined that the effective
sequestration of witnesses necessarily requires that witnesses not
listen to the testimony of other witnesses, that prospective witnesses not consult with each other prior to testifying, and that a
witness who has left the stand not consult with a prospective
witness.101 Wigmore admonished that “nothing should sanction any
indirect method of conveying to the prospective witnesses information of the testimony already given. For example, it would seem
obvious to good sense that the perusal of journals reporting the
testimony should be forbidden.”102 Circuits reading Rule 615 expansively find Wigmore’s extra-tribunal protections embedded or
implied in the language of the Rule.103

98. See also State v. Buchholz, 678 N.W.2d 144, 150-51 (N.D. 2004) (holding that the state
did not violate the sequestration order by meeting simultaneously with claimant and claimant’s high school friend because the order did not address out-of-court communications among
sequestered witnesses).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2018).
100. See WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1840.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 37, 50, 53
(1986) (“[W]e believe the word ‘hearing’ in Rule 615 was intended by the FRE drafters to
include the precise three-step process outlined by Wigmore.... We recognize that the plain
language of Rule 615 refers only to the ‘hearing of testimony.’ But as we previously explained,
that phrase has had a long-standing and consistent judicial construction of prohibiting all
prospective witnesses from hearing, overhearing, being advised of, reading, and discussing,
the previously given in-court testimony of witnesses on their own side as well as the opposite
side.”).
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The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Robertson is
typical of those that construe Rule 615 sequestration orders expansively in keeping with Wigmore’s vision.104 The defendant in
Robertson was a United States postal employee charged with theft
of mail.105 Before trial, the district court entered an order sequestering witnesses pursuant to Rule 615.106 Nonetheless, during the trial,
the prosecution permitted two government witnesses to review a
transcript of testimony given by the case agent who was a key
witness for the prosecution.107 When the defense charged the
government with violating the sequestration order, the district court
expressed uncertainty about whether the provision of transcripts
outside the courtroom violates a Rule 615 order that only speaks to
witness presence in the courtroom.108
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit tackled the issue identified by the
district court. In so doing, the court rejected the plain language interpretation of a Rule 615 order as inconsistent with the purpose of
sequestration:
[A]n interpretation of Rule 615 that distinguishes between
hearing another witness give testimony in the courtroom and
reading the witness’s testimony from a transcript runs counter
to the rule’s core purpose—“to prevent witnesses from tailoring
their testimony to that of earlier witnesses.” The danger that
earlier testimony could improperly shape later testimony is
equally present whether the witness hears that testimony in
court or reads it from a transcript. An exclusion order would
mean little if a prospective witness could simply read a transcript of prior testimony he was otherwise barred from
hearing.109

The court therefore held that “[a] trial witness who reads testimony
from the transcript of an earlier, related proceeding violates a Rule

104. 895 F.3d at 1214-16.
105. Id. at 1209.
106. Id. at 1214.
107. Id. at 1215.
108. Id. The district court concluded that cross-examination of the government witnesses
about their exposure to the transcript was an appropriate remedy, even assuming a violation
occurred. Id.
109. Id. (citations omitted).

2021]

“THE” RULE: WITNESS SEQUESTRATION

21

615 exclusion order just as though he sat in the courtroom and
listened to the testimony himself.”110
In United States v. McMahon, the Fourth Circuit evaluated the
important question of whether a witness can be held in criminal
contempt for accessing daily transcripts and information about trial
proceedings from outside the courtroom in the face of a straightforward Rule 615 order.111 The defendant in McMahon was convicted
of criminal contempt for violating the court’s sequestration order
during his son’s criminal trial.112 In the son’s trial, the district court
granted the defense’s request “to sequester the government’s witnesses ‘so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses’”
and the reciprocal government request.113 When the trial began with
witnesses excluded, defense counsel asked the court to permit the
defendant’s father to remain in the courtroom.114 The prosecution
objected, noting the father’s “critical” role as a witness in the case,
and the court ordered the father excluded.115 Thereafter, the prosecution observed the father’s personal secretary sitting in the
courtroom throughout the trial taking voluminous notes.116 Upon
examining her, the court learned that the secretary was documenting the trial testimony, as well as exhibits admitted at trial, in her
notes, and providing those notes and daily trial transcripts to the
defendant’s sequestered father.117 The court ultimately found the
father in criminal contempt for willful violation of the court’s sequestration order.118
On appeal of his conviction, the father argued that the district
court erred in finding him in criminal contempt because it never
instructed counsel and witnesses on the “intended scope” of the
court’s basic Rule 615 order.119 The Fourth Circuit noted that, in
110. Id. at 1216. Notwithstanding the Rule 615 violation by the government, the court
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing cross-examination as a
remedy. Id.
111. 104 F.3d 638, 639-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 639.
113. Id. at 640.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 644.
119. Id. at 642 (“McMahon’s chief claim is that the sequestration order was not sufficiently
specific to provide the basis for a finding of criminal contempt.”).
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order to be held in criminal contempt, a defendant must have violated a decree which was “‘definite, clear, and specific’ enough so
that it leaves ‘no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of those to whom
it was addressed.’”120 Upholding the criminal contempt conviction,
the Fourth Circuit found the district court’s sequestration order
“stunningly simple” and “[t]he interest protected ... clear: to prevent
the possibility of one witness shaping his testimony to match that
given by other witnesses at the trial.”121 The court upheld the finding of the district court that an instruction to the defendant “that he
could not circumvent the sequestration order by reviewing trial
transcripts or receiving reports from his secretary would simply
have stated the obvious.”122 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found evidence
of the defendant’s receiving and reviewing daily transcripts sufficient to uphold the criminal contempt conviction even though the
district court issued only a straightforward Rule 615 order limited
to physically excluding witnesses from the courtroom.123
However, the en banc opinion in United States v. Rhynes muddied
the scope of Rule 615 orders in the Fourth Circuit.124 As will be discussed further infra, the key issue in Rhynes was whether attorneys
violate sequestration orders entered under Rule 615 when they
communicate trial testimony to witnesses during trial preparation.125 Determining that attorneys are not bound by sequestration
orders, a five-judge plurality voiced a plain language interpretation
of Rule 615: “It is clear from the plain and unambiguous language
of Rule 615 that lawyers are simply not subject to the Rule. This
Rule’s plain language relates only to ‘witnesses,’ and it serves only
to exclude witnesses from the courtroom.”126 Both concurring and
dissenting judges cited McMahon with approval, however.127 And
Judge Niemeyer in dissent described the Fourth Circuit’s purposive
approach to Rule 615:

120. Id. at 642 (quoting Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n. v. City of Richmond, 548
F.2d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 1977)).
121. Id. at 643 (quoting United States v. Leggett, 326 F.2d 613, 613 (4th Cir. 1964)).
122. Id. at 644.
123. Id.
124. See 218 F.3d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
125. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
126. Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 316.
127. Id. at 324 (Wilkins, J., concurring); id. at 329 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
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While the express directive of Rule 615—that witnesses be
“excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses”—suggests most immediately the exclusion of witnesses
from the courtroom, it has always been understood also to
preclude the discussion among witnesses of testimony that has
taken place in the courtroom. Common sense commands that if
a rule prohibits a witness from “hearing” the testimony of other
witnesses, the prohibition is violated if the testimony of a prior
witness is repeated and heard in the courthouse corridor or
outside on the street.128

Judge Niemeyer also interpreted the plurality’s opinion to maintain
a common-sense purposive approach to communications among
witnesses outside the courtroom, finding that the plurality’s limitation on Rule 615 related to counsel only.129 Thus, the proper
interpretation and scope of Rule 615 has caused confusion within a
single circuit, as well as conflicts among them.
The Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits similarly adopted
an expansive reading of Rule 615 orders to prohibit access to testimony outside the courtroom.130 In United States v. Friedman, the
Second Circuit emphasized that the reading of daily transcripts
outside the courtroom could amount to a violation of a Rule 615
128. Id. at 334 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 335 (“[T]he plurality does not seem to take issue with the notion that Rule 615
prohibits one witness from speaking with another witness or with anyone else.”).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 975, 980 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(concluding that a witness violated a Rule 615 exclusion order by reading the testimony of
another agent witness from a prior mistrial); United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 375
(10th Cir. 1986) (“On appeal the defendants argue that Rule 615 requires not only that prospective witnesses be excluded from the courtroom, but also that they be prohibited from
discussing the case with other witnesses. We agree.”); United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886,
892 (5th Cir. 2002) (assuming that it would be “a violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 615”
for witnesses housed together in a prison facility to discuss their testimony outside of court);
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United
States v. Johnston, 578 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A] circumvention of the rule does
occur where witnesses indirectly defeat its purpose by discussing testimony they have given
and events in the courtroom with other witnesses who are to testify.”); United States v. Baca,
447 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1238 (D.N.M. 2020) (interpreting Rule 615 broadly to require witness
exclusion during voir dire although the language of the Rule speaks only to exclusion during
the “testimony” of other witnesses and stating that “[t]he Court agrees with those courts taking broad approaches to rule 615. Permitting witnesses to overhear the substance of others’
testimony in argument or any other form would defeat rule 615’s anti-tailoring, antifabrication, and anti-collusion aims.”).
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order.131 Similarly, in United States v. Jimenez, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the government’s attempt to rely on the plain language of
Rule 615:
The government argues that reading a witness’ testimony from
a prior trial does not constitute a violation of the order. It relies
on Rule 615’s language prohibiting the “hearing” of testimony.
As this circuit held in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
there is no difference between reading and hearing testimony
for purposes of Rule 615. Either action can violate a sequestration order.132

And in United States v. Greschner, the Tenth Circuit found that
Rule 615 “requires not only that prospective witnesses be excluded
from the courtroom, but also that they be prohibited from discussing
the case with other witnesses.”133
Courts that adopt an expansive reading of Rule 615 appropriately
recognize that access to testimony outside of court may be more
harmful than listening to it in court.134 If a witness has a transcript,
that witness can pore over it for details, and even memorize it. As
the Fifth Circuit in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. stated,
reading a transcript enables a witness to “thoroughly review and
study [previous testimony] in formulating his own.”135
In sum, the majority of federal circuits take an expansive
approach to Rule 615, notwithstanding its textual coverage of physical exclusion only, and find witness collaboration or access to trial
testimony outside the courtroom prohibited.
C. A Clash of Titans: A Textualist vs. A Purposive Approach to
Rule Construction
Lurking beneath the conflict in the federal courts regarding the
scope of Rule 615 is the age-old debate over a “plain language” or “textualist” approach to construing a statute or rule and an “expansive”
131. 854 F.2d 535, 568 (2d Cir. 1988).
132. 780 F.2d at 980 n.7 (citation omitted).
133. 802 F.2d at 375.
134. See, e.g., Miller, 650 F.2d at 1373.
135. Id. The Second Circuit cited this portion of the Miller opinion with approval in United
States v. Friedman. See 854 F.2d at 568.

2021]

“THE” RULE: WITNESS SEQUESTRATION

25

or “purposive” one. A strict textual approach to statutory construction can be described as “the view that a text can and should be
understood purely by examining its structure and meaning of its
words, without the assistance of extratextual materials as interpretive aids.”136 Noted adherents to this approach, such as the late
Justice Antonin Scalia, eschew reliance on legislative history or
intent in interpreting statutory text, due to concerns over “separation of powers and notions about the rule of law as a system of
constraining rules.”137
The Supreme Court has applied this plain meaning method of
construction to the Federal Rules of Evidence in various contexts.
In United States v. Salerno, the prosecution immunized grand jury
witnesses, who then unexpectedly testified favorably for the defendants.138 When the defense sought to introduce those favorable
grand jury statements against the government at trial under the
former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, the district court
refused, holding that the government lacked a “similar motive” to
examine the witnesses as the government had in the grand jury
proceedings, as required by the exception.139 Ignoring the “similar
motive” requirement in the former testimony exception, the Second
Circuit found the statements admissible, reasoning that it would be
unfair to allow the government to immunize witnesses in the hope
of obtaining damaging testimony and then hide behind the hearsay
rule if the testimony actually exculpated the defendant.140 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Second Circuit had no
authority to ignore the plain meaning of the former testimony
exception and its “similar motive” requirement, in the name of
adversarial fairness.141 Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence
136. Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict
Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 405 (1994); see also Lumen N.
Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2167, 2182
(2017) (“[A]dvocates of this view typically maintain that courts should rely primarily on
textual sources of meaning, including the ordinary understanding of the operative provisions,
related parts of the same act or the whole code, and established canons of statutory
interpretation, to ascertain the objective meaning of the statutory text to a reasonable user
of English.”).
137. Karkkainen, supra note 136, at 403.
138. 505 U.S. 317, 319 (1992).
139. Id. at 321.
140. Id. at 320.
141. Id. at 321.
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Thomas explained that Congress “presumably made a careful
judgment as to what hearsay may come into evidence and what may
not” and “[t]o respect its determination, we must enforce the words
that it enacted.”142
The Court also followed a textualist road to its destination in interpreting the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule in
Bourjaily v. United States.143 In that case, the defense argued that
a common law proscription on “bootstrapping”—that prohibited a
trial judge from considering the hearsay statement itself in assessing its admissibility under the coconspirator exception—survived
the codification of the exception in Rule 801(d)(2)(E).144 Despite the
common law pedigree of the bootstrapping prohibition and policy
arguments in its favor, the Court turned to the plain language of
Rule 104(a) in rejecting the defense’s arguments: “Rule 104, on its
face, appears to allow the court to make the preliminary factual
determinations relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) by considering any
evidence it wishes, unhindered by considerations of admissibility.
That would seem to many to be the end of the matter.”145 The Court
held that a trial court could consider anything it deemed appropriate in deciding admissibility, including the hearsay statement in
question, because the plain and unambiguous language of Rule
104(a) so provided.146
Circuit judges interpreting Rule 615 have relied on this plain
meaning approach and its supporting rationale to limit the reach of
the Rule to the physical exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom.
For example, in his concurrence in the en banc opinion in United
States v. Rhynes, Judge J. Michael Luttig advocated for strict construction of Rule 615, opining, “[o]bedience to the language of law is
not to engage in ‘clever wordplay’ or to indulge in ‘literalistic
construction,’ and it must never be mistaken as such. It could not be

142. Id. at 322.
143. 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987).
144. Id.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. Id.; see also United States v. Bauzó-Santiago, 867 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2017)
(explaining that interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence “start[s] with the text of the
rule” and that courts “must give effect to the rule’s plain meaning, ‘unless it would produce
an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the [rule’s] intended effect’” (quoting CólonMarrero v. Vélez, 813 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2016))).
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further from these. It is, rather, the very essence of law.”147 Under
this view, Rule 615 may not be read to regulate witness behavior or
access to trial testimony beyond the courtroom because the language
of the Rule expressly requires only that witnesses be “excluded so
that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.”148 This language
clearly refers to physical exclusion from the courtroom during trial
and the direct observation of trial testimony by prospective witnesses.
Notwithstanding the strict constructionist’s allegiance to the text
of a statute, there is acknowledgement that it is a “fundamental
judicial function [to] read ... the body of enacted laws in such fashion
as to cause none of them to be pointless.”149 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a Federal Rule of Evidence should not be
read literally if strict adherence to its text would lead to an “absurd”
result.150 In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., the Court examined Rule 609, which regulates impeachment of a witness with a
prior felony conviction.151 At the time of Green, Rule 609 provided a
protective balancing test that made it more difficult to impeach “defendant[s].”152 Although this balancing test appeared designed to
protect criminal defendants from prejudicial impeachment with
their prior felonies, the plain language of the Rule covered all defendants, including defendants in civil cases.153 Because a literal
interpretation of Rule 609’s text would offer an inexplicable and
unfair advantage to civil defendants over civil plaintiffs, the Court
refused to take the Rule at its word: “[n]o matter how plain the text
of the rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would
deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary’s testimony that it grants to a civil defendant.”154
Such analysis could be used to support a more expansive view of
Rule 615, even accepting the legitimacy of a textual approach to
147. United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 328 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring).
148. FED. R. EVID. 615.
149. Karkkainen, supra note 136, at 408 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1,
15 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
150. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
151. Id. at 505 (majority opinion).
152. Id. at 509.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 510.
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construction. Numerous circuits that interpret Rule 615 to extend
beyond the courtroom have noted that the physical exclusion of
witnesses from the courtroom is a futile and empty exercise if witnesses may, consistent with the Rule, obtain trial testimony outside
the courtroom.155 Arguably, a “strict” construction that renders a
Rule 615 order meaningless is “absurd” and should be avoided. It
should also be noted that the strict construction of the Rule is even
more pointless in the increasingly frequent situations in which
witnesses testify remotely; in those situations, an order excluding
a witness from the “courtroom” is not only ineffective, it is irrelevant.
Furthermore, even noted textualists like Justice Scalia have looked to the policy or purpose that generated an enactment to resolve
ambiguities in statutory language.156 On the one hand, a true
textualist would likely argue that the language of Rule 615 is
anything but ambiguous. The First Circuit noted the language of
Rule 615 clearly “contemplates a smaller reserve; by its terms,
courts must ‘order witnesses excluded’ only from the courtroom
proper.”157 But Rule 615’s admonition that witnesses should not
“hear” the testimony of other witnesses could be deemed ambiguous
as to witness communications about testimony outside the courtroom doors. Even courts preferring the textual interpretation might
resolve such ambiguity by reference to the clear policy underlying
Rule 615: the threat to the truth-seeking process if testifying
witnesses are permitted to tailor their testimony one to the other.158
Therefore, it could be argued that the Rule’s prohibition on witnesses “hearing” testimony should be read to extend beyond the
courtroom’s entrance to best serve the purpose for which the rule
was enacted.159
On the other side of the coin, the more expansive approach to the
construction of Rule 615 reflects a purposive method of rule
interpretation. The purposive school of thought emerged most
155. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2018).
156. See Karkkainen, supra note 136, at 408.
157. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993).
158. FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s note.
159. Of course, the counterargument is that the reference to “hearing” testimony is within
the context of physical exclusion. The Rule provides that witnesses be “excluded so that they
cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.” FED. R. EVID. 615.
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prominently following World War II and the passage of the New
Deal.160 Although also tethered to the notion of legislative supremacy, the purposive approach to statutory construction prioritizes
effectuating a particular provision’s underlying policy over linguistic and semantic purity.161 A purposive philosophy of construction
seeks “to identify the objective purposes that a reasonable person
would attribute to a statute and its operative provisions, and to
determine the best way to carry out those purposes under the
circumstances presented in each case.”162 Although this school of
thought values outcomes that effectuate the goal behind a particular
enactment, it also seeks to “avoid results that could not be squared
with the statutory text.”163 Still, when the plain meaning of a text
would lead to a problematic result, purposivists are willing to follow
the “familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers.”164
The Federal Rules of Evidence may be uniquely suited to purposive construction.165 Federal Rule of Evidence 102 specifically
blesses a flexible interpretation of the Rules: “These rules should be
construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of
evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a
just determination.”166 While this directive should certainly not be
160. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 136, at 2182.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2194.
164. Id. (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); see also
Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 571 (1996) (“Sometimes we must look beyond the words
of the Rules to understand evidentiary doctrine. We must do so when the Rules are not
definitive or are ambiguous ... but sometimes even when the text is clear.”).
165. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 857, 867 (1992) (“[T]here is a growing recognition that generalized, global theories of
statutory interpretation are less helpful than approaches tailored to individual statutes.”);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of
Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 762-81 (1990) (identifying several situations in which a plain
meaning approach will reach a result that is simply wrong on the merits, either because it is
unfair or not fully thought out by Congress).
166. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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interpreted to give trial courts carte blanche to ignore clear and unambiguous requirements in the Rules, such as the “similar motive”
requirement analyzed in Salerno, it is in keeping with the general
tenor of the Rules. The Federal Rules of Evidence are often intentionally ambiguous, purposely leaving ample room for judicial
discretion in the administration of a trial.167 Given that the Rules
are designed to afford significant judicial flexibility, a strict, plain
language approach to their interpretation seems a poor fit:
Many of the Rules, however, although “clear” and “plain,” are
purposely flexible. For example, whether information will “assist” or “confuse” the trier of fact is a quintessential judicial
judgment call. Where Congress purposely left a point open or
vague, attempts to justify various interpretations by resort to
plain meaning are disingenuous.168

Especially when a Rule is silent with respect to a particular
requirement or a specific limitation, a purposive interpretation that
reinforces a “generally shared interpretation of the Rules deriving
from preexisting common law traditions” may be most appropriate.169 As one evidence treatise puts it, “[i]f a Rule says nothing
about a particular requirement ... [o]ne must resort to the policy
behind the Rules ..., the entire body of text of the Rules, and
relevant legislative history to determine whether the requirement
should be imposed.”170
Federal courts have applied the purposive approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence when a rule is silent with respect to certain
requirements or limitations. In Tome v. United States, for example,
the Supreme Court found a “premotive” requirement implied within
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that permits admission of certain prior consistent
statements for their truth, although the text of the Rule includes no
167. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that a trial judge “may exclude relevant
evidence” if she finds its “probative value is substantially outweighed by” various dangers).
168. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 165, at 867-68.
169. Id. at 868.
170. See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 3, § 102.02 (citing Eileen A. Scallen & Andrew E.
Taslitz, Reading the Federal Rules of Evidence Realistically: A Response to Professor
Imwinkelried, 75 OR. L. REV. 429, 440 (1996) (“While careful consideration of rules passed by
Congress suggests that the text deserves the greatest relative weight when it is clear, where
there is any ambiguity, other indicators of intent, such as legislative history, must be
examined precisely to show appropriate deference to legislative authority.”)).
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such limitation.171 The Court did so to effectuate the Rule’s purpose
to admit only prior consistent statements that serve to rehabilitate
an impeached testifying witness, reasoning that only premotive,
consistent statements possess the requisite rehabilitative effect.172
Similarly, in United States v. Webster, Judge Richard Posner found
that a party may not call a witness only to impeach her with a prior
inconsistent statement when the party knows that the witness will
not provide helpful trial testimony.173 Judge Posner reasoned that
it would be “an abuse of [Rule 607]” to allow such a tactic—
notwithstanding the plain language of Rule 607 that expressly
permits any party “including the party that called the witness” to
“attack the witness’s credibility” without limitation.174
Given Rule 615's silence with respect to witnesses learning of
trial testimony outside the courtroom, a similar purpose-oriented
approach to its interpretation may be justified. The underlying goal
of the Rule is to prevent witnesses from coordinating their testimony in a manner that undermines the accuracy of the trial
process.175 The purposive courts recognize that Rule 615’s textually
mandated physical exclusion from the courtroom is inadequate to
fulfill that purpose and that further protections are necessary to
regulate witness collaboration and contamination beyond the courtroom. “[A]n interpretation of Rule 615 that distinguishes between
hearing another witness give testimony in the courtroom and
reading the witness’s testimony from a transcript runs counter to
the rule’s core purpose.”176 Because rigid adherence to the letter of
Rule 615 would defeat the important purpose behind the Rule, some
federal courts have found that the Rule’s text implies extra-tribunal
protections:
We recognize that the plain language of Rule 615 refers only to
the “hearing of testimony.” But as we previously explained, that
phrase has had a long-standing and consistent judicial
171. 513 U.S. 150, 157, 160 (1995).
172. Id. at 162-63.
173. 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984). This limitation applies only to prior inconsistent
statements that are offered solely for impeachment and are not admissible for their truth. Id.
at 1193.
174. Id. at 1192; see FED. R. EVID. 607.
175. See United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2018).
176. Id. at 1215.
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construction of prohibiting all prospective witnesses from
hearing, overhearing, being advised of, reading, and discussing,
the previously given in-court testimony of witnesses on their
own side as well as the opposite side.177

As is always the case, there are some clear benefits, and corresponding downsides, to the interpretations of Rule 615 on both sides
of the current circuit split.
The principal benefit of a strict, textual approach to the interpretation of Rule 615 orders relates to notice. If a trial judge simply
alerts parties that she is invoking “Rule 615” or is ordering witnesses “sequestered” according to the Rule, parties consulting the
Rule—or their counsel—will find only a prohibition on the physical
presence of witnesses in the courtroom. Other restrictions on
witness conduct beyond the confines of the courtroom remain
unexpressed and uncertain; parties operating under typically terse
Rule 615 orders may not appreciate that a casual conversation over
lunch could run afoul of the court’s mandate or that a shared ride to
the courthouse with a fellow witness could constitute a violation.
Depriving parties of the use of important witnesses due to the violation of such latent proscriptions can be said to penalize the parties
without proper advance notice. Even more troubling, punishing a
witness through contempt for transgressing unexpressed limitations
violates important due process considerations.178 Therefore, a
narrow interpretation of Rule 615 that extends the Rule to the
courtroom doors, but no further, may maximize fairness to parties
and witnesses from a notice perspective. While more is required to
regulate the risk of tailoring, those extra proscriptions can be
provided by additional orders that specifically prohibit witnesses
from accessing or obtaining testimony while outside the courtroom.
177. Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 37, 53 (1986).
178. Cf. RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 164, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2018)
(finding that an expert witness did not violate the express terms of the sequestration order
by “participat[ing] in after-Court briefing sessions where testimony of the other witnesses was
freely and openly discussed” because “nothing in the Court’s order provided for more than fact
witnesses’ exclusion from the courtroom during testimony”). But see United States v.
McMahon, 104 F.3d 638, 644-45 (4th Cir. 1997). In this case, the witness was a defendant in
a criminal contempt proceeding for a Rule 615 violation. Id. at 642. The Court ultimately
rejected the defendant’s argument that the boilerplate Rule 615 sequestration order at issue
failed to provide the requisite notice for criminal contempt, reasoning that it was “obvious”
that the sequestration order prohibited access to testimony. Id. at 644-45.
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Requiring trial judges to utilize common law powers to extend antitailoring measures beyond the courtroom could provide the crucial
notice to parties and witnesses about the precise conduct regulated.
On the other hand, as suggested above, a cramped and narrow
reading of Rule 615 that permits witnesses operating under a Rule
615 order to leave the courtroom proceedings during a recess and to
collaborate freely with prospective witnesses clearly frustrates the
important purpose of the provision.179 Notwithstanding the literal
language of Rule 615, sequestered witnesses who claim ignorance
when confronted about purposely communing with other prospective
witnesses or about otherwise accessing trial testimony bring to mind
a teenager (call him “Technicality Tim”) who claims that he did not
realize that an admonition not to “take a car out” included his
mother’s minivan. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, an instruction to
a sequestered witness “that he could not circumvent the sequestration order by reviewing trial transcripts or receiving reports from
his secretary would simply have stated the obvious.”180 And if
parties protected by a Rule 615 order reasonably assume that their
adversary’s witnesses are forbidden from collaborating outside the
courtroom, they may not appreciate the need to request more specific court orders and protections.
Importantly, the conflict in the courts about the extent of a Rule
615 order is not about whether they can prevent prospective witnesses from talking to other witnesses or reading trial transcripts.
The courts clearly have the power to do so.181 The conflict is over
whether a party must obtain a supplemental order (or supplemental
language in a Rule 615 order) to prevent access to trial testimony,
or whether it is sufficient simply to invoke “the witness rule” or
impose a Rule 615 order.182
In actuality, neither of the existing approaches to the scope of a
Rule 615 sequestration order is satisfactory. A plain language
approach that limits the order to physical departure from the
courtroom permits witnesses to access testimony freely and tailor
179. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 2, § 6.71 (noting that an order removing a witness from
the courtroom “is largely ineffective unless he is also sequestered (separated from other
witnesses outside the courtroom)”).
180. McMahon, 104 F.3d at 644.
181. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (1st Cir. 1993).
182. See id. at 1176.
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away so long as they do so outside the courtroom. Although trial
courts in jurisdictions following this approach remain free to enter
additional orders expressly extending protections beyond the
courtroom, the longstanding custom is to enter brief orders tracking
only Rule 615. In these circuits, therefore, the important policy of
preventing tailored testimony is undermined. But the expansive
interpretation of brief sequestration orders entered under the
textual authority of existing Rule 615 (that automatically extends
protections beyond the courtroom) is not an ideal solution either. A
prospective witness learning only from counsel that Rule 615
requires that she remain outside the courtroom may not fully
appreciate the dangers of casually conversing with another witness
during a shared ride or meal. The problem of adequate notice
plagues the expansive reading of sequestration orders given the
current language of Rule 615.
Artful interpretation of the existing Rule, therefore, will not
satisfactorily resolve the proper scope of a federal sequestration
order. There is an inherent tension between the text of Rule 615 and
its clear policy that courts cannot eliminate. The language of Rule
615 creates an irreconcilable conflict that can only be resolved by
amending the Rule to bring its text and its animating policy into
alignment.
III. THE ATTORNEY PARADOX
When sequestration protections are extended beyond the courtroom, federal courts disagree on the application of such prohibitions
to counsel. One obvious way prospective witnesses might access trial
testimony outside the courtroom is through a discussion with trial
counsel. Attorneys trying a case commonly prepare witnesses before
putting them on the stand.183 Trial counsel is thus in a position to
convey the content of testimony given by prior witnesses to prospective witnesses during their preparation. Federal courts also conflict
as to whether attorneys’ transmission of testimony during witness
preparation constitutes a sequestration violation. In amending Rule
183. See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 278-79 (1989)
(“American litigators regularly use witness preparation, and virtually all would, upon reflection, consider it a fundamental duty of representation and a basic element of effective
advocacy.”).
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615, rulemakers must determine whether and how to deal with the
application of sequestration protections to counsel.
A. A Sequestration Free Pass for Attorneys: The Fourth Circuit
Approach
In United States v. Rhynes, a plurality of the Fourth Circuit
sitting en banc held that sequestration prohibitions do not apply to
counsel and that a trial judge may not forbid a lawyer from preparing a witness with trial testimony.184 Rhynes was a criminal
prosecution involving a large-scale drug conspiracy.185 At the beginning of trial, the district court gave a sequestration order that did
purport to extend beyond the courtroom:
Well, I do grant the usual sequestration rule and that is that the
witnesses shall not discuss one with the other their testimony
and particularly that would apply to those witnesses who have
completed testimony not to discuss testimony with prospective
witnesses, and I direct the Marshal’s Service, as much as can be
done, to keep those witnesses separate from the-those witnesses
who have testified separate and apart from the witnesses who
have not yet given testimony who might be in the custody of the
marshal.186

When a lawyer for one of the defendants sought to have his investigator excepted from the sequestration order, the court granted the
exception, reiterating the prohibition on communicating testimony
to prospective witnesses: “[s]o long as your investigator observes Rule 615 and does not talk to the witnesses about testimony
that has just concluded.”187
Once the trial began, a prosecution witness, Davis, testified that
a man by the name of Alexander was involved in defendant
Rhynes’s drug transactions.188 This testimony apparently came as
a surprise to Rhynes’s defense counsel who had planned to call

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

218 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 313 n.1.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
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Alexander as Rhynes’s sole supporting witness.189 In preparing
Alexander for his testimony, Rhynes’s counsel directly told Alexander that Davis had testified and had implicated him in drug
dealing.190 When the defense counsel’s disclosure of Davis’s testimony came to light during Alexander’s trial testimony, the district
court held that counsel had violated his sequestration order.191
Accordingly, the district court granted the prosecution’s motion to
strike Alexander’s testimony and to exclude him as a witness, expressing frustration with defense counsel: “It’s very unprofessional.
It’s an absolute breach of the Rule 615, and I don’t see how you
think you can get that just because you think you are preparing a
witness.”192 Rhynes was convicted, and a panel of the Fourth Circuit
upheld his conviction.193 Thereafter, the Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc solely on the issue of Alexander’s exclusion due to
defense counsel’s sequestration violation.194
On rehearing, a plurality of the Fourth Circuit held that the trial
judge’s invocation of “the usual sequestration rule” was “an obvious
invocation of Rule 615.”195 The appellate court examined the text of
Rule 615 and observed that “[i]t is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 615 that lawyers are simply not subject to
the Rule. This Rule’s plain language relates only to ‘witnesses,’ and
it serves only to exclude witnesses from the courtroom.”196 Thus, the
appellate court concluded that the trial judge’s invocation of “the
rule” did not prohibit defense counsel from revealing testimony to
prospective witnesses, noting that nothing in the language of the
trial judge’s order covered counsel.197 Furthermore, the plurality
cited authorities interpreting Rule 615 stating that “court decisions
and the leading commentators[ ] agree that sequestration orders
prohibiting discussions between witnesses should, and do, permit
witnesses to discuss the case with counsel for either party.”198 Most
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315 n.4.
Id. at 314 n.2.
Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 317.
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significantly, the plurality found that Rhynes’s counsel’s revelation
of witness testimony to a prospective defense witness was necessary
to fulfill “his duties, both constitutional and ethical, as a lawyer.”199
The court stated that a criminal defense attorney “must be free to
interview defense witnesses and to discuss with them all appropriate matters, without being subjected to an overbroad sequestration
order.”200 In sum, the plurality found that Rule 615 does not, and
that trial courts may not, limit counsel’s ability to convey trial
testimony to prospective witnesses during witness preparation.201
Three Fourth Circuit judges joined in dissent, arguing that an
attorney exception to sequestration protections would be “contrary
to precedent and common sense.”202 The dissent emphasized that an
attorney exception would eviscerate sequestration protections in
every case by allowing attorneys to act as “go-betweens” in transmitting trial testimony to sequestered witnesses.203 Notwithstanding
the literal language of Rule 615 governing the physical presence of
witnesses in the courtroom, the dissent urged that “[c]ommon sense
commands that if a rule prohibits a witness from ‘hearing’ the testimony of other witnesses, the prohibition is violated if the testimony
of a prior witness is repeated and heard in the courthouse corridor
or outside on the street.”204 The dissent pointed to precedent
upholding a sequestration violation involving counsel.205 Finally, the
dissent observed that counsel may fulfill its constitutional and
ethical duties to prepare witnesses without revealing trial testimony
to them.206 Indeed, Rhynes’s defense counsel acknowledged as much
in his colloquy with the district court:
Your Honor, as I told you in chambers, I now realize that the
proper thing for me to do in interviewing Alexander and preparing him to testify was that I could have asked him all the
details of whether he had been a dealer and whether he had
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
1987)).
206.

Id. at 319.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 332 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 334.
Id.
Id. at 335 (citing Jerry Parks Equip. Co. v. Se. Equip. Co., 817 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.
Id. at 336.
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done drug deals with Michael Rhynes and that sort of thing
without telling him that Davis had said that he had done that.207

No other circuit court has expressly adopted the Rhynes plurality’s approach exempting lawyers from sequestration orders. Only
a few federal district courts appear to accept the Rhynes attorney
exemption. In Minebea Co. v. Papst, a district court held that a
lawyer could not be precluded from using courtroom testimony to
prepare witnesses.208 Still, the district court cautioned counsel that
“if any lawyer in this case inappropriately ‘coaches’ a witness or
helps a witness ‘tailor’ his testimony or fabricate or dissemble, there
will be consequences.”209 The court opined that courts “must trust
and rely on lawyers’ abilities to discharge their ethical obligations.”210
In Cruz v. Maverick County, a district court found no sequestration violation even where witnesses on the second day of trial
appeared to have tailored their testimony to testimony given on the
first day of trial, after consultation with counsel.211 The court stated
that because “[t]he right to counsel, even in civil cases, ‘is one of
constitutional dimensions and should thus be freely exercised
without impingement’ ... [a]pplying [Rule] 615 to attorney-client
communications would thus violate the Plaintiffs’ due process right
to retain counsel.”212 Similarly, the defendant in R.D. v. Shohola,
Inc., requested that the trial court “sequester witnesses at trial and
instruct witnesses not to discuss their testimony with counsel, or
with one another.”213 The court declined, however, to regulate witness preparation by counsel “beyond observing that no counsel may
endeavor to communicate with witnesses while they are testifying
during breaks in their testimony.”214 However, the plurality opinion
in Rhynes constitutes the lone circuit precedent for an attorney
“exception” to sequestration protection.215
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 329 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
374 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236 (D.D.C. 2005).
Id. at 237.
Id. (quoting Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 320).
No. DR-14-CV-050-AM, 2018 WL 8897808, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2018).
Id. (quoting Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980)).
No. 3:16-CV-01056, 2019 WL 6133748, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2019).
Id. at *2.
218 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2000).
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B. Counsel Bound by Sequestration Protections
As noted by the dissent in Rhynes, federal precedent does not
support a sweeping attorney exemption from sequestration.216
Indeed, very few federal opinions squarely address the issue of
attorney adherence to sequestration proscriptions. The federal opinions that note the issue suggest that attorneys should take care not
to reveal trial testimony to witnesses during preparation. For
example, in United States v. Buchanan, the Tenth Circuit emphasized counsel’s obligation to protect sequestration: “Counsel know,
and are responsible to the court, not to cause any indirect violation
of the Rule by themselves discussing what has occurred in the courtroom with the witnesses.”217 Ironically, the Rhynes plurality cited
Buchanan for the proposition that sequestered witnesses may
nonetheless talk to counsel, ignoring this important caveat that
counsel is bound to uphold sequestration protections in discussions
with witnesses.218 Indeed, the federal opinions stating that sequestered witnesses may still talk to counsel do not involve scenarios
like the one in Rhynes in which counsel directly conveyed trial testimony to a prospective witness.219
Other federal courts have found counsel bound by sequestration
protections in order to avoid tailored witness testimony. United
States v. Binetti was a criminal prosecution for cocaine distribution
in which credibility issues were central to the jury’s determination
of the defendant’s guilt.220 The trial judge admonished the jury that
a sequestration violation by defense counsel should be taken into
account in weighing the credibility of the defense witnesses.221 The
defendant argued that the finding of a sequestration violation
based upon counsel’s conduct and the resulting admonition were

216. Id. at 332 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
217. 787 F.2d 477, 485 (10th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Guthrie, 557 F.3d 243,
248-49 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasizing that counsel may not coach witnesses or disclose trial
testimony in discussions with them).
218. 218 F.3d at 317 (citing Buchanan, 787 F.2d at 485).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 613 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding no
sequestration violation when a nonlawyer disclosed information).
220. 547 F.2d 265, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d on rehearing on other grounds, 552 F.2d
1141 (5th Cir. 1977).
221. Id. at 269.
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erroneous.222 The Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction and found
that the trial judge had not abused his discretion:
The witnesses had been advised not to discuss the case with one
another during the course of the trial. Yet the defense attorney,
the defendant and two witnesses discussed the trial at lunch.
The defendant contends that the trial judge’s instructions in
invoking the rule were unclear, and did not put the defense on
notice that it was prohibited to converse outside of the courtroom with the witnesses who had not yet testified. He claims the
rule on its face applies only to exclusion of witnesses from the
courtroom, and that he was not given the parameters of any
expansion of that scope.
The instruction given by the court upon invocation of the rule
was sufficient. His remedial action of comment to the jury was
within the discretionary power of the court.223

More recently, in United States v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit
held that government witnesses violated the trial court’s Rule 615
order by reading transcripts of a pretrial evidentiary hearing at
which another prospective government witness testified.224 Significantly, it was the prosecutors who provided the transcript to their
prospective witnesses to help prepare them for trial.225 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the trial court’s finding of a sequestration violation.226
Federal courts have similarly found sequestration violations due
to attorney conduct in civil cases. In Jerry Parks Equipment Co. v.
Southeast Equipment Co., the defendant Southeast invoked Rule
615, and all nonparty witnesses were ordered excluded from the
courtroom.227 Southeast called witness William Dann during its
case.228 When cross-examined, Dann admitted that he had briefly
discussed trial testimony with Southeast lawyers in preparation for

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
895 F.3d 1206, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
817 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id.
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his testimony.229 The trial judge struck Dann’s testimony and the
court of appeals affirmed, finding no exception for counsel under
Rule 615.230 Similarly, in Reeves v. International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s finding
of a sequestration violation when counsel met for three hours with
at least eleven prospective witnesses to discuss their case and
prepare for testimony.231 The Court emphasized that this was a
“direct and flagrant violation of a previously entered sequestration
and separation order.”232
In Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. United States, a
government contractor brought suit against the government seeking
an equitable adjustment to a dredging contract.233 During trial, it
came to light that the government’s defense counsel set up a conference room in a hotel where witnesses were staying to brief
government witnesses on the progress of the trial, including testimony given by the plaintiff ’s witnesses.234 The defendant argued
that “sequestration orders cannot be read or fashioned to interfere
with the preparation of a case for trial” and may not prevent
necessary activities by counsel to make adjustments to a case as
trial proceeds.235 The court noted that the trial testimony was provided to prospective witnesses directly by defense counsel.236 After
reviewing federal authorities, the court found trial counsel’s
conference room briefings to prepare witnesses to be “gross violations” of the court’s Rule 615 order.237 The court emphasized that
prohibiting counsel from revealing trial testimony would not preclude counsel from preparing witnesses: “There is no prohibition by
any ruling this Court has made, Mr. Casey, that will preclude either
counsel from conferring with [his] witnesses. The prohibition is

229. Id.
230. Id. at 342-43.
231. 616 F.2d 1342, 1355 (5th Cir. 1980), rev’d on other grounds by McLaughlin v. Richland
Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1988).
232. Id.
233. 11 Cl. Ct. 37, 39 (1986).
234. Id. at 41.
235. Id. at 52.
236. Id. at 50.
237. Id. at 51.
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divulging to such witnesses who have not testified the testimony of
any witness who has previously testified. That’s the prohibition.”238
Finally, in Paradigm Alliance, Inc. v. Celeritas Technologies, LLC,
defense counsel also violated the trial court’s Rule 615 order by preparing a defense witness with previously given testimony.239 The
court reasoned that to allow counsel to prepare a witness with trial
testimony “would ultimately serve to largely nullify the purpose for
which Rule 615 exists.”240
Accordingly, the weight of the case law authorizes trial courts to
prohibit counsel from disclosing trial testimony to prospective
witnesses. While counsel is surely expected to prepare witnesses, it
does not follow that counsel is allowed to—or needs to—disclose
trial testimony in doing so.
C. Allowing Counsel to Disclose Trial Testimony to a Prospective
Witness: The Merits and Demerits
The courts that prohibit counsel from using trial testimony to
prepare witnesses have the better side of the argument. First and
foremost, allowing attorneys to disclose trial testimony to witnesses
would essentially render Rule 615 meaningless. Trial counsel could
set up a war room akin to the one described in the Weeks case where
they could provide daily transcripts and witness updates to prospective witnesses.241 Such an arrangement—set up in the name of
effective witness and trial preparation—would be justified under the
relentless logic of the Rhynes plurality.242 Allowing attorneys to act
as conduits for trial testimony would foster the tailoring of testimony decried as unjust since Biblical times.243 An attorney exception
to Rule 615 sequestration would thus come at a prohibitive cost. It
makes no sense to have a rule guarding against witness tailoring
that is so easily evaded.244
238. Id. at 53; see also Zeigler v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1018 (N.D. Iowa
2004) (finding that counsel’s preparation of a trial witness with testimony presented the day
before constituted a sequestration violation that justified exclusion of the witness).
239. 722 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1273 (D. Kan. 2010).
240. Id.
241. See 11 Cl. Ct. at 41.
242. See United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 319 (4th Cir. 2000).
243. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
244. See Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 335 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f Rule 615 precludes a
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Further, the benefit of allowing attorneys to prepare witnesses
with trial testimony is scant. As many courts have acknowledged,
counsel may prepare a prospective witness by discussing and inquiring about underlying facts.245 To prepare a witness competently
for her trial testimony, counsel need not directly relate the testimony already given by prior witnesses. Even the defense attorney
who ultimately benefitted from the attorney exemption created by
the Rhynes plurality acknowledged that he could have prepared the
defense witness to deal with allegations that the witness was himself a drug dealer effectively without referencing trial testimony.246
The Rhynes plurality rejected a distinction between counsel communicating with a prospective witness about underlying facts and
counsel relating trial testimony to a prospective witness, opining
that such a distinction “fails because it is simply—and unnecessarily—splitting hairs.”247 Query whether it really is “splitting hairs” to
allow counsel to ask a prospective witness “have you at any time
been involved in drug dealing?” but not to allow counsel to relate
that “a witness testified that you are a drug dealer.” The danger
regulated by sequestration is the tailoring that occurs from listening to what others have said at trial. A direct question from a lawyer
about a fact does not raise the same risk of tailoring from witness
testimony. Of course, it is true that direct questions from a lawyer
could, in some cases, constitute impermissible coaching, but that is
a separate wrong unrelated to Rule 615. Simply put, if the witness
does not hear, directly or through a conduit, what was actually said
at trial, there is no risk of tailoring that is regulated by Rule 615. To
the extent this is splitting hairs, then it can be said that splitting
hairs is what lawyers do, especially under the Rules.

person from acting as an intermediary to relate to one witness the testimony of another, how
can we exempt an attorney from the proscription? Just as a discussion among witnesses
outside the courtroom would frustrate the rule that one witness cannot hear the testimony
of another, a discussion between a witness and an attorney about another witness’ testimony
frustrates the rule.”).
245. Id. at 336.
246. Id. at 329 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (“I now realize that the proper thing for me to
do in interviewing Alexander and preparing him to testify was that I could have asked him
all the details of whether he had been a dealer and whether he had done drug deals with
Michael Rhynes and that sort of thing without telling him that Davis had said that he had
done that.”).
247. Id. at 320 n.11.
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Of course, it is possible that a wily witness would figure out from
a lawyer’s question that the lawyer gleaned the information from
trial testimony. But surely figuring out whether such circumstances
are a violation of an order should be left to the discretion of the
court. The fact that a lawyer might take advantage of a “just the
facts” exception does not mean that there should be a broader
exception that allows a lawyer to directly and without limitation
disclose trial testimony to a prospective witness.
For these reasons, an amendment to Rule 615 that resolves the
scope of a federal sequestration order could also expressly make
sequestration prohibitions applicable to counsel. Indeed, Maryland
Rule of Evidence 615 does just that: “A party or an attorney may not
disclose to a witness excluded under this Rule the nature, substance, or purpose of testimony, exhibits, or other evidence introduced during the witness’s absence.”248
But, while allowing counsel to prepare witnesses with trial
testimony is seriously problematic, amending Rule 615 to cover
counsel expressly is probably ill-advised. First, at least in criminal
cases, limitations on counsel’s communications with prospective
witnesses would have constitutional implications. As the Rhynes
plurality noted, “sequestration orders that prevent attorneys from
performing their duties as counsel, including discussing trial
proceedings with future witnesses, may well violate a criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.”249 Furthermore, counsel’s
ethical obligations demand competent representation and thorough
preparation.250 Curtailing counsel’s ability to prepare prospective
witnesses with a concrete evidence rule could create tension with
this professional obligation in some instances. In addition, rules of
professional conduct impose a duty of candor upon attorneys as
officers of the court—“that duty both forbids an attorney from knowingly presenting perjured testimony and permits the attorney to
refuse to offer evidence he or she reasonably believes is false.”251
248. MD. R. EVID. 615(d)(1) (emphasis added); see also Jones v. State, 520 S.E.2d 454, 456
(Ga. 1999) (“The rule does not prohibit discussions between an attorney to the case and a prospective witness, at least so long as the attorney talks to him separately from the other witnesses and does not inform him of previous testimony.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Ross v.
State, 326 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 1985)).
249. Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 318 n.9.
250. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
251. Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 318; see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR
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These ethical duties limit the risks associated with attorney revelation of trial testimony to prospective witnesses—rendering it less
necessary to regulate by rulemaking.252
Even if a Rule 615 sequestration order can be applied against
counsel, such an order raises complex questions of professional
responsibility, and in criminal cases it raises thorny questions about
the right to effective assistance of counsel.253 These sensitive issues
are generally beyond the ken of evidence rulemaking and may best
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, without having an evidence
rule seeking to control or influence their resolution. Moreover, the
“hair-splitting” referred to above—allowing witness preparation
with an underlying fact or allegation but without attributing it to
trial testimony—may be challenging to impart effectively in rule
text.
It is typically wise to resolve any underlying conflicts in the application of an evidence rule in connection with other amendments
to the same rule.254 As illustrated above, there is indeed a conflict in
the federal case law with respect to counsel’s obligations under a
sequestration order. Moreover, the majority of federal courts that
prohibit attorneys from acting as conduits for trial testimony in the
name of witness preparation appear to be on the right side of the
conflict. But all that said, the conflict concerning attorney compliance with sequestration restrictions may be best left to the federal
courts to resolve on a case-by-case basis due to the constitutional
and ethical issues tangled up in the equation. An optimal amendment to Rule 615 that resolves the proper scope of a federal court’s
sequestration order may seek to bypass the vexing issue of attorney
compliance. To ensure that trial courts and counsel are attuned to
the problem, however, a committee note to an amended Rule 615
should highlight the issue and note that it is to be regulated by the
courts on a case-by-case basis.255
ASS’N 2019).
252. See Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 318.
253. See Applegate, supra note 183, at 288.
254. Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Poetry in Motion: The Federal Rules of Evidence
and Forward Progress as an Imperative, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1886 (2019) (“[W]hen a conflict
is long-standing, shows no signs of being resolved, and creates divergent standards for litigants operating within the same court system, it is a drafting committee’s responsibility to
resolve the impasse.”).
255. This is the solution proposed by the Advisory Committee. The committee note to the
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IV. GOOD HOUSEKEEPING: THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE
EXCEPTION
There are sometimes textual imperfections or interpretive conundrums in a Federal Rule of Evidence that do not cause sufficient
disruption to justify a costly amendment to the rule in their own
right. When other, more weighty concerns about the provision’s
operation necessitate a revision, however, these lesser nettlesome
issues should be addressed by the resulting amendment. The
rulemaking process is deliberate and lengthy.256 It would make little
sense to undertake the cumbersome amendment process and leave
defects capable of correction untouched. Furthermore, once a rule
has been amended (or has been considered for an amendment that
is not proposed), it may be a decade or more before the same
provision is taken up by an advisory committee for reconsideration.257 Therefore, rulemakers should not waste an opportunity to
recommend needed clarifications to a provision when proposing
other, more significant amendments. The designated representative
exemption found in Rule 615(b) should be clarified as part of a
broader amendment that resolves the scope of a sequestration order.
Just such a housekeeping amendment was included in the recent
amendment to Rule 404(b).258 The Rule 404(b) amendment focused
on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
offered against criminal defendants.259 The amendment ultimately
proposed amendment to Rule 615, currently out for public comment, provides as follows:
“Nothing in the language of the rule bars a court from prohibiting counsel from disclosing trial
testimony to a sequestered witness. However, an order governing counsel’s disclosure of trial
testimony to prepare a witness raises difficult questions of professional responsibility and
effective assistance of counsel, as well as the right to confrontation in criminal cases, and is
best addressed by the court on a case-by-case basis.” See Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments, supra note 28, at 306.
256. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 136, at 2190 (“[T]he current seven-step
rulemaking process is by most assessments ... overly ossified, taking two and a half years to
promulgate rules.”).
257. See, e.g., Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra to Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, Proposed Amendment to Rule 106 8 n.5 (Oct. 1, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/a3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VKE-QKKC] (noting that the possibility of amending
Rule 106 had previously come before the Committee in 2002 and 2006).
258. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
259. See, e.g., Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra to Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, Consideration of Possible Changes to Rule 404(b) (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.
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proposed and created a more muscular notice requirement with
respect to such evidence in criminal cases.260 In considering the
notice amendment, the Evidence Advisory Committee noted that the
word “other” in the heading attached to Rule 404(b) had been
relocated during the restyling of the Rules in 2011, such that thenRule 404(b) covered the admissibility of “Crimes, Wrongs, or Other
Acts.”261 Because the Rule 404(b) standard governs admissibility
only of crimes, wrongs, or acts other than the charged offense in a
criminal case, the modifier “other” was misplaced, seeming to reference “acts” only.262 This misplaced modifier did not appear to be
responsible for defects in the Rule 404(b) precedent; however,
federal courts have long understood that the limitations in Rule
404(b) apply only to crimes, wrongs, or acts other than those charged
or claimed in a particular case. Accordingly, this grammatical snafu
would have been insufficient to justify a costly amendment to Rule
404(b) standing alone. Still, after several years of deliberation
resulted in a proposal to amend the notice provision in Rule 404(b),
it made good sense to relocate the modifier “other” to its proper
place as part of the amendment package to accurately capture the
intended operation of the Rule.263
A similar irregularity exists in the interpretation of Rule 615(b)
that merits consideration as an add-on to an amendment clarifying
the scope of a federal court’s sequestration order. As described
above, certain witnesses are permitted to remain in the courtroom
as of right under Rule 615 notwithstanding a sequestration order.264
The Rule contains mandatory exemptions from exclusion for “a
party who is a natural person” (subdivision (a)), and for “an officer
or employee of a party that is not a natural person” who is designated as the party’s representative (subdivision (b)).265 The trial
judge lacks authority to exclude from trial any witness falling

gov/sites/default/files/agenda_book_advisory_committee_on_rules_of_evidence_-_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BEA9-YGQL].
260. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3).
261. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (2019 version).
262. Of course, Rule 404(b) also applies to the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
offered in civil cases. See id.
263. See id.
264. See supra Part II.B.
265. FED. R. EVID. 615(a)-(b).
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within one of these exemptions.266 These exemptions make sense.
Excluding a party would be fundamentally unfair and, in criminal
cases, would raise “constitutional issues relating to confrontation
and effective assistance of counsel.”267 The exemption for entity
representatives in Rule 615(b) was properly designed to create
“parity of treatment” for parties that are not natural persons.268 The
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 615 justifies the exemption for a
party’s designated agent “[a]s the equivalent of the right of a
natural-person party to be present, a party which is not a natural
person is entitled to have a representative present.”269 If entities did
not have an absolute right to designate an agent, they would be
disadvantaged compared to individual litigants.270
In addition to the mandatory exemptions from sequestration,
Rule 615 maintains the discretion of the trial judge to permit a
person “whose presence a party shows to be essential” to remain in
the courtroom.271 This exemption is not automatic or self-executing
like the others. A party seeking to have a witness remain in the
courtroom under this discretionary exemption bears the burden of
demonstrating to the court that the witness is “essential” to its ability to present its case.272 Relevant considerations in determining
whether a witness is “essential” include:

266. Although the trial judge lacks authority to sequester such witnesses pursuant to Rule
615, she enjoys the discretion to exclude persons falling within these Rule 615 exemptions on
other grounds. For example, even a criminal defendant with a constitutional right to
confrontation who is exempt from sequestration pursuant to Rule 615(a) may be removed from
the courtroom for disrupting the proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970)
(“Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss
of constitutional rights, we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues
his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him
in the courtroom.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
267. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, § 6:109.
268. Id.
269. FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s note.
270. Tellingly, the committee note states that “[m]ost of the cases have involved allowing
a police officer who has been in charge of an investigation to remain in court despite the fact
that he will be a witness.” Id.
271. FED. R. EVID. 615(c).
272. Id.
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the case’s complexity, the trial’s length, the extent of the witness’s knowledge or expertise, the risks posed by not excluding
the witness, and whether others are already present or available
to help counsel, such as non-witnesses or witnesses exempt from
required exclusion under the first two exceptions to Rule 615.273

There appears to be a conflict in the federal cases concerning the
mandatory sequestration exemption for entity representatives in
Rule 615(b). Most federal courts have held that an entity party may
designate only a single officer, employee, or agent to serve as the
courtroom representative for the entity under Rule 615(b) and must
bear the burden of demonstrating “essentiality” under Rule 615(c)
for any additional witnesses remaining in the courtroom.274 Others
have suggested that an entity—usually the government in a criminal case—might designate more than one agent to represent it in
the courtroom during testimony under the mandatory exemption in
Rule 615(b).275 This potential conflict was highlighted by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama in United
States v. McGregor.276 In that case, the government sought to designate two agents as immune from sequestration in a lengthy public
corruption case to provide “logistical and case specific expertise.”277
The court observed the seemingly conflicting authority guiding its
decision:
The circuit courts are divided as to which provision of Rule 615
permits multiple agents. The Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have limited the government to one representative
under Rule 615(b) and one “essential-presence” agent under
Rule 615(c). By contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has permitted multiple representatives under Rule 615(b).... The
distinction between the two subsections is not merely academic.
Rule 615(b) is a mandatory exception, whereas Rule 615(c)

273. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 52, § 6245 (footnotes omitted).
274. See, e.g., United States v. McGregor, No. 2:10cr186-MHT, 2012 WL 235519, at *1-2
(M.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2012) (describing different positions taken by federal courts vis-à-vis Rule
615(b)).
275. See id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at *1.
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requires the government to make a showing that the second
agent is essential to the presentation of its case.278

A. The Single-Representative Interpretation of Rule 615(b)
The majority of federal courts that have considered the issue have
interpreted Rule 615(b) to permit the designation of only a single
entity representative who may remain in the courtroom notwithstanding a sequestration order. For example, in United States v.
Farnham, the defendant was convicted of making false statements
to a grand jury.279 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred in refusing to exclude one of two case agents designated
by the prosecution as representatives pursuant to Rule 615(b).280
Taking a textualist approach to Rule 615, the Fourth Circuit found
reversible error based upon the trial court’s refusal to sequester one
of the two testifying case agents: “Relying on the mandatory
language of Rule 615 and the singular phrasing of the exception embodied in 615(2), we hold that the district court erred in refusing to
sequester Agent Martin.”281
Venturing beyond the plain language of the designated representative exemption into the Advisory Committee Notes discussing it,
the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Pulley followed the Fourth
Circuit’s lead in finding a numerical limitation on Rule 615(b).282 In
that drug conspiracy prosecution, the district judge concluded that
Rule 615(b) afforded him discretion to allow two government agents,
both of whom were on the prosecution’s witness list, to remain in
the courtroom throughout the trial as representatives of the government.283 The appellate court disagreed, stating:

278. Id. (citations omitted). The district court sidestepped the apparent conflict by allowing one government agent to be designated as a “representative” under Rule 615(b) and by
finding the second agent to be “essential” to the presentation of the government’s case under
Rule 615(c). Id. at *3.
279. 791 F.2d 331, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1986).
280. Id. at 334. The designated representative exemption from sequestration was styled
as subsection 2 of Rule 615 at the time. Id. at 334 n.4.
281. Id. at 335.
282. 922 F.2d 1283, 1286 (6th Cir. 1991).
283. Id. at 1284.
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The Fourth Circuit’s reading of the rule is supported by the
notes of the Advisory Committee, which contain this sentence:
“As the equivalent of the right of a natural-person party to be
present, a party which is not a natural person is entitled to
have a representative present.” ... “Most of the cases,” the note
continues, “have involved allowing a police officer who has been
in charge of an investigation to remain in court despite the fact
that he will be a witness.”
“A” representative, like “a” natural person, “a” police officer, and
“an” officer or employee, is singular. Our court has been known
to treat the plural as the functional equivalent of the singular,
... but in the instant case we can discern no reason to convert the
singular into the plural.284

The Pulley court held that an entity like the government remains
free to attempt to show that additional agent witnesses are “essential” to the presentation of its case under Rule 615(c).285 The First,
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have likewise adhered to a single designated representative interpretation of Rule 615(b).286
Limiting an entity party to a single designated representative
appears most consistent with the text of Rule 615(b), as well as its
underlying policy. Indeed, noted authorities have explained that
entity parties would obtain an unfair advantage relative to natural
persons should entities be entitled to designate more than one witness representative:

284. Id. at 1286 (citations omitted).
285. Id. The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed this view in United States v. Phibbs. 999 F.2d 1053,
1073 n.4 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Unlike Fed. R. Evid. 615(2) [restyled as 615(b)], Rule 615(3)
[restyled as 615(c)] does not restrict the number of witnesses who may be deemed ‘essential
to the presentation of [a] party’s cause.’”).
286. See Capeway Roofing Sys., Inc. v. Chao, 391 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he bare
language of Rule 615 suggests that only one [designated agent] should have stayed.”); United
States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court had the
discretion to exempt multiple testifying law enforcement agents from sequestration if they
were shown to be “essential” under Rule 615(c)); United States v. Williams, No. 91-7094, 1993
WL 125403, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 1993) (finding that the government was permitted to
keep only one of the two case agents at the counsel table pursuant to Rule 615(b)). Other
courts also adhere to this view. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 122526 (D. Kan. 2003) (noting that although the government was allowed only one representative
at trial, it was free to seek exemption for additional witnesses it could demonstrate were
“essential” to its presentation).
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There are compelling reasons to restrict this exception to one
representative at a time. Both Rule 615(b) and the Advisory
Committee’s Note describe who is subject to this exception by
employing nouns stated in the singular rather than plural. Further, the policy underlying this second exception would
be undermined by permitting a party that is not a natural
person to appoint more than one representative at a time ....
[T]hat policy is to avoid unfairness by giving a party that is not
a natural person a right to avoid exclusion comparable to the
right created by Rule 615(a) for a party that is a natural person.
But permitting a party that is not a natural person to exempt
multiple representatives from exclusion could be unfair since a
party that is a natural person can avoid exclusion under Rule
615(a) only for himself.287

B. Multiple Entity Representatives
Notwithstanding the weight of authority favoring a singlerepresentative approach to the Rule 615(b) exemption, some federal
opinions suggest that an entity may designate more than one
witness to represent it during trial. In United States v. Jackson, the
prosecution sought to have three testifying case agents sit at counsel table.288 In response to the defendants’ objection to more than
one agent, the prosecution argued that it needed all three agents
due to the “voluminous amount of evidence and electronic equipment to control.”289 The defense continued to object to more than one
agent in the courtroom notwithstanding the size of the case.290 The
district court thereafter overruled the defense objections without
explanation and permitted all three testifying case agents to remain
in the courtroom.291 Importantly, the trial judge did not articulate
which exemptions to Rule 615 justified this arrangement.292
Following their convictions, the defendants appealed, arguing
that the court ran afoul of Rule 615’s exemptions by allowing three

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 52, § 6245 (footnote omitted).
60 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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case agents to remain in the courtroom instead of only one.293 The
Second Circuit considered the automatic designated representative
exemption in Rule 615(b), the essential person exemption in Rule
615(c), and whether the drafters of Rule 615 “contemplated the
exemption of only one person for each subprovision.”294 Although the
court noted that the Rule 615 exemptions are drafted in the singular, it held that the court “would be reading the language too
narrowly to assume that the use of the singular implies that the
drafters intended to allow only one exemption per provision.”295 It
reasoned that “[b]ecause the Rule does not expressly limit to one the
number of exemptions per provision, we conclude that this discretion extends to deciding whether, in a particular case, more than
one witness should be exempt under a particular subprovision.”296
In upholding the defendants’ convictions, the court stated: “[w]hile
we would expect it to be the rare case when a district judge exempts
more than one witness under a particular subprovision of Rule 615,
we hold that a district court judge has discretion to do so.”297 The
Jackson court set forth six factors to be considered by the district
court in exercising this discretion—which it essentially invented
given that the Rule 615(b) exemption is self-executing.298
Jackson certainly suggests that a district court has the discretion
to allow more than one entity representative to remain in the
courtroom under the mandatory exemption in Rule 615(b).299
Ultimately, however, the Jackson court stated that the trial judge
may have abused her discretion in allowing more than one case
agent under the discretionary Rule 615(c) exemption for “essential
persons,” due to the ability of nontestifying personnel to assist the
prosecution with exhibits and equipment.300 The court upheld the
defendants’ convictions only on the basis that a Rule 615 error, if
any, was harmless.301 In sum, the Second Circuit employed language
that hinted that a trial judge may have discretion to allow more
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 134.
See id. at 135.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 137.
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than one designated entity representative under Rule 615(b), but its
resolution of the case did not hinge upon such discretion.302
The Ninth Circuit has also stated in an unpublished decision that
an entity may designate more than one representative under Rule
615(b). In United States v. Lach, the defendant in a tax evasion prosecution appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred
in permitting two government agents to remain at the counsel table
over his objection.303 In upholding the conviction, the court stated
that “[w]e have read [Rule 615(b)], however, to permit two individuals to represent a party at counsel table.”304
United States v. Alvarado, out of the former Fifth Circuit,305 has
also been cited in support of a discretionary approach to Rule 615(b)
that allows more than one designated entity representative.306 In
that drug prosecution, the defendants argued that Rule 615 permits
only one government investigative agent to be excused from sequestration.307 The court rejected the defense interpretation of Rule 615,
holding that “the decision as to how many will be excused from
sequestration is just as discretionary with the trial judge as who
will be excused.”308 The Alvarado court went on to conclude that
adequate grounds existed to exempt two agents from sequestration
“under the second and third exceptions” to Rule 615.309
That language can be read in two ways. On one hand, it could be
read to suggest that a district court has the discretion to allow multiple witnesses to remain in the courtroom under both subsection (b)
and subsection (c), meaning that a party might exempt multiple
witnesses using either provision. Indeed, district courts in the
Eleventh Circuit have so construed Alvarado.310 On the other hand,
the Alvarado language could be read to mean that the court needed
302. Id. at 134-37.
303. No. 94-50109, 1995 WL 124323, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 1995).
304. Id.
305. The Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994.
306. 647 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1981).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., United States v. Spina, 654 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff’d, 881 F.2d
1086 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The Court has the discretion to permit the Government to name more
than one exempted representative.” (citing Alvarado, 647 F.2d at 540)); Pless v. United States,
No. 07-21111-Civ-MOORE, 2007 WL 9810934, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2007) (same).
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to rely upon a combination of Rule 615(b) and (c) to exempt multiple
case agents from sequestration. In other words, the court possessed
the authority to exempt one case agent from sequestration under
Rule 615(b) and the second under the separate “essential” exemption under Rule 615(c). The post-1981 Fifth Circuit has since
interpreted Alvarado in exactly that manner.311
Imprecise and ambiguous language in some of the opinions favoring a discretionary approach to the designated representative
exemption in Rule 615(b) make it difficult to determine whether
there is a true circuit split. But clarification of the scope of Rule
615(b) and its relationship to Rule 615(c) in an amendment to Rule
615 will clear up the confusion surrounding the exemptions evident
in the federal cases.312 Such an amendment will aid trial judges and
litigants routinely faced with Rule 615 exemption issues, particularly in criminal cases where the prosecution customarily seeks to
have multiple case agents remain in the courtroom. In fact, recent
district court opinions raise this very issue.313
Although a discretionary approach to Rule 615(b) that allows designation of multiple entity representatives represents the minority
position in the federal courts, some authoritative commentators
support the approach:
Given the liberality of joinder rules, it may be impossible to find
one person within the structure of a large entity who has all the
information needed to assist the attorney; and the court should
311. See United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 2002).
312. An amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 615 on this point might also serve as a
helpful model for state courts, where precedent similarly reveals confusion about the number
of designated entity representatives exempt from sequestration. Compare Stafford v. State,
736 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting the single-representative interpretation),
and Wash. Cnty. Assessor v. W. Beaverton Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc., 18 Or.
Tax 226, 230 (Or. T.C. 2005) (same), with People v. Tirado, No. O-85-202, 1986 PR Sup.
LEXIS 81, at *2 (P.R. Jan. 15, 1986) (adopting the multiple-representative interpretation),
In re E.W., No. 05AP-1088, 2006 WL 1431404, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2006) (same), and
Commonwealth v. Burgess, No. 700 WDA 2015, 2016 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3197, at *7-10 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2016) (same).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, No. 18-CR-120, 2020 WL 373552, at *1 (D. Minn.
Jan. 23, 2020) (“Although the rule refers to ‘agent’ in the singular, courts allow the government to designate multiple case agents when relevant.”); United States v. Spencer, No. 18-cr0114, 2019 WL 2367096, at *2 (D. Minn. June 5, 2019) (noting that Rule 615(b) permits
“[e]mployees designated as representatives of an entity party” to be exempt from sequestration, allowing the government to designate multiple case agents as representatives).
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allow some flexibility in designation consistent with the objectives of the rule. Unnecessary exclusion of one of a number of
representatives may slow down the trial by requiring continuances so an attorney can consult with persons outside the
courtroom. There must be wide discretion in the trial judge to
allow multiple representatives.314

But the better rule is clearly that an entity is limited to a single
designated representative under Rule 615(b).315 First, a single designated representative is most consistent with the plain language of
Rule 615(b), which exempts “an” officer or employee of a party designated as the party’s “representative.”316 This interpretation also
squares with the policy behind the entity representative exemption
outlined in the Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 615.317 Given
that an individual party who is a natural person may use the
automatic exemption in Rule 615(a) only for herself, it would place
entity parties in a superior position at trial were they permitted to
automatically designate multiple witness representatives. Such a
construction fails to achieve the “parity” between individual and
entity parties that was the goal of Rule 615(b).318
Further, the exemptions in Rule 615(a) and (b) are designed to be
automatic and self-executing. The whole idea is that an entity need
not make any showing to take advantage of Rule 615(b); it need only
name or “designate” its representative.319 Given the automatic nature of the Rule 615(b) exemption, it affords no basis upon which a
trial court may exercise “discretion” to allow for multiple designations.320 Moreover, if entity parties are permitted simply to “designate” multiple witness representatives, it renders the “essential”
exemption almost superfluous in the case of an entity party—why
go to the bother of demonstrating the “essential” nature of a witness
if one may simply designate her as a representative?
314. 4 MARK S. BRODIN, JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 615.04 (Mark S. Brodin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2021).
315. See Capra & Richter, supra note 254, at 1891 (“In selecting the optimal uniform
standard to resolve a conflict with credible arguments on both sides, a drafter should
ordinarily give greater weight to the majority rule on an issue.”).
316. FED. R. EVID. 615(b).
317. FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
318. Id.; see supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
319. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 52, § 6245.
320. See id.
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If a trial court is to exercise some discretion in allowing multiple
designated representatives under Rule 615(b)—such as determining
the entity party’s “need” for the additional representative in light of
the complexity of the case, the expertise of the agent witness, and
the ability of nontestifying personnel to assist—it uses precisely the
factors that courts consider in determining whether a witness is
“essential” to a party’s presentation under Rule 615(c).321 Such an
interpretation renders Rule 615(c) duplicative in the case of entity
parties. To the extent that a large corporate entity or the government requires the assistance of additional testifying agents in the
courtroom in a complex case, Rule 615(c) is tailor-made to accommodate such a situation. So long as the entity party can make the
showing of essentiality for every witness exempted under Rule
615(c), there is no numerical limit on the number of qualifying
witnesses.322 The optimal approach to Rule 615 exemptions, therefore, appears to be the one embraced by the majority of federal
circuits—an entity party may designate a single representative to
remain in the courtroom under Rule 615(b), to treat it consistently
with individual parties, and may utilize Rule 615(c) to exempt any
additional witnesses it can demonstrate are “essential” to presenting its case.
C. Changing Horses During the Race: A Designated
Representative Relay
Perhaps surprisingly, there may be an additional twist on the
designated entity representative exemption. In some cases, an entity party may seek to switch out or swap designated representatives
throughout different phases of a lengthy case.323 In such a circumstance, there are multiple designated representatives, but only one
present in the courtroom at any one time.324 In an amendment
addressing the designated entity representative split of authority,
this niche issue could be addressed in one of two ways in an
accompanying Advisory Committee Note.
321. See id.
322. See FED. R. EVID. 615(c).
323. See, e.g., Breneman v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1986) (permitting
one designated representative during pretrial depositions and a second at trial).
324. See id.
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One approach would be to bless this designated representative
substitution as a matter of practical convenience given the reality
of lengthy proceedings in complex cases that may make it difficult
for any single agent to represent an entity for the duration. On the
other hand, if entities have carte blanche to exchange witness
representatives freely throughout trial, this gives the entities an advantage over individual parties, who cannot treat their right to be
present at trial as a relay event. A sequential approach to witnessrepresentatives designated by entities could lead to gamesmanship
and a playing field tilted in favor of already powerful entity
litigants.325 So, the competing solution would be an Advisory Committee Note that forbids an automatic representative exchange
under Rule 615(b), and that counsels entities to seek approval for
the sequencing of witness-representatives by making the “essential”
showing required by Rule 615(c). It would seem to be the rare case
in which a single entity representative who is also a testifying
witness cannot sit through the entire proceeding and another testifying witness is the only viable replacement. In a case where such
exigencies truly exist, an entity party should be capable of making
a showing that the exchange of testifying designated representatives is “essential” to the presentation of the case.326
V. MODERNIZING RULE 615
Perhaps because of its straightforward and universally accepted
purpose and longstanding application, Federal Rule of Evidence 615
has been overlooked and even taken for granted. Yet, the fundamentally important sequestration principle protected by Rule 615 is
threatened by the inconsistent interpretation and operation of the
325. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 52, § 6245.
326. The Advisory Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 615, currently
issued for public comment, opts for allowing entities to switch representatives during the
course of the litigation: “Finally, the rule has been amended to clarify that the exception from
exclusion for entity representatives is limited to one designated agent per entity. This
limitation, which has been followed by most courts, generally provides parity for individual
and entity parties. The rule does not prohibit the court from exercising discretion to allow an
entity-party to swap one representative for another as the trial progresses, so long as only one
witness-agent is exempt at any one time. If an entity seeks to have more than one witnessagent protected from exclusion, it is free to argue under subdivision (a)(3) that the additional
agent is essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense.” Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments, supra note 28, at 307 (emphasis added).
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provision in the federal courts. In some circuits, like the First, a
Rule 615 order operates only to remove testifying witnesses physically from the courtroom.327 In other circuits, such as the Ninth, a
similar order does much more—it automatically prohibits witnesses
from accessing testimony while outside the courtroom doors.328 The
purpose of a single code of evidence that applies throughout the
federal court system is to provide stable and uniform evidentiary
protections regardless of the location of a trial.329 And resolving
circuit splits is one of the most important functions of a rulemaking
committee.330
Accordingly, the split of authority regarding Rule 615 is uniquely
in need of a rulemaking solution. Unlike many circuit splits in
which the majority of the federal courts on one side of the split
employ an optimal interpretation of a provision, neither of the
existing interpretations of Rule 615 is ideal.331 In jurisdictions
construing Rule 615 strictly, the standard “sequestration” order is
essentially meaningless, permitting witnesses to obtain trial
testimony freely beyond the courtroom without violating the court’s
order.332 In the jurisdictions that interpret the Rule expansively to
give effect to its true purpose of preventing tailored testimony,
witnesses subject to terse “sequestration” orders may not appreciate
the unexpressed limitations on their extra-tribunal conduct.333 And
it is Rule 615 that creates this untenable state of affairs because its
text is in tension with its clear intent.334 In an age when technology
and public health are only increasing the risks of tailoring, an
amendment is imperative to update and clarify the bedrock sequestration rule.
There are essentially two options for an amendment that would
address the interpretive shortcomings in the existing Rule 615
precedent. One would memorialize the First Circuit approach in
327. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1993).
328. See United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2018).
329. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary of the “Preliminary Study of the
Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts”:
Mission Accomplished?, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1367, 1368-69 (2011).
330. See Capra & Richter, supra note 254, at 1886.
331. See id. at 1891.
332. See supra Part II.A, C.
333. See supra Part II.B-C.
334. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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rule text, alerting litigants that all a brief “Rule 615” order mandates is physical exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom—but
specifically providing that the court may grant additional
protections against out-of-court access to trial testimony at its
discretion.335 The other would adopt the majority approach to Rule
615 that automatically extends protections beyond the courtroom,
but would provide clear notice in rule text that a “Rule 615” order
has an expanded reach.336 Both amendment alternatives should
leave the question of counsels’ adherence to sequestration prohibitions open for courts to regulate as needed.337 Both should address
the split of authority regarding the number of designated entity
representatives allowed to remain in the courtroom under Rule
615(b).338
A. Rule 615 Mandates Physical Exclusion Only, with the Express
Possibility of Additional Orders
One amendment possibility to fix what ails Rule 615 would be to
express in rule text the limits of a concise “Rule 615” order, while
expressly highlighting the discretionary option to provide additional
protections on a case-by-case basis. This amendment would essentially enshrine the First Circuit approach to Rule 615 orders in
rule text.339 Such an amended provision would provide as follows:340
Rule 615. Excluding Witnesses from the Courtroom; Preventing
an Excluded Witness’s Access to Trial Testimony
(a) Excluding Witnesses. At a party’s request, the court must
order witnesses excluded from the courtroom so that they cannot
hear other witnesses’ testimony. Or the court may do so on its
own. But this rule does not authorize excluding:
(a) (1) a party who is a natural person;
335. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1993).
336. See United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2018).
337. See supra Part III.
338. See supra Part IV.
339. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1176-77.
340. Additions to the existing rule language are underscored in this draft and deletions are
redacted.
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(b) (2) an one officer or employee of a party that is not a
natural person, after being who is designated as the party’s
representative by its attorney;
(c) (3) any persons whose presence a party shows to be
essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense; or
(d) (4) any persons authorized by statute to be present.
(b) Additional Orders to Prevent Disclosing and Accessing
Testimony. An order under (a) operates only to exclude witnesses from the courtroom. But the court may also, by order:
(1) prohibit disclosure of trial testimony to witnesses who
are excluded from the courtroom; and
(2) prohibit excluded witnesses from accessing trial testimony.

A “discretionary” amendment such as this one will improve the
existing state of Rule 615 affairs. First, it clarifies its limited scope
in clear rule text. Litigants obtaining the typical “sequestration” or
“Rule 615” order would have unambiguous guidance on the face of
the Rule about the scope of the protection they enjoy, that is, that
such an order operates only to physically exclude witnesses from the
courtroom and no more. Some state jurisdictions have adopted
exactly this approach to sequestration.341 Second, it would alert
litigants who review the rule text of their ability to seek additional
protections should they desire them. Third, this amended rule would
remind trial judges of their authority to control witness behavior
beyond the courtroom and of their obligation to spell out any such
limitations in a detailed order.342 Fourth, it would leave trial judges
free to limit attorney revelation of testimony to prospective
witnesses—or not, consistent with constitutional and ethical mandates.343 Finally, this amendment would resolve the seeming split
341. See, e.g., OHIO R. EVID. 615(A) (“An order directing the ‘exclusion’ or ‘separation’ of
witnesses or the like, in general terms without specification of other or additional limitations,
is effective only to require the exclusion of witnesses from the hearing during the testimony
of other witnesses.”).
342. See supra Part II.C.
343. See supra Part III.
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of authority regarding the number of testifying designated entity
representatives allowed to remain in the courtroom as of right in
favor of the single representative approach favored by a majority of
federal courts.344
One concern with the proposal above is that old trial customs die
hard. If trial judges adhere to custom and deliver only terse sequestration orders invoking “Rule 615,” federal witnesses will
remain free to obtain trial testimony outside the courtroom doors
and to tailor their testimony accordingly. But it should be presumed
that rule amendments make a difference, and this one would clearly
inform the courts that they must do more than issue a “Rule 615”
order if they want to combat the tailoring of testimony that could
occur by a witness having access to trial testimony out of court.
This amendment gives the trial judge discretion to extend
sequestration protections beyond the courtroom, meaning that a
trial judge would also possess the discretion to deny such protections, even upon request. While that is a concern, there is a
competing consideration: the decision of whether and how to control
access to trial testimony outside of court is a complex one that is
case-dependent—it is a much more complicated question than
simply excluding all witnesses from a courtroom. Some cases may
be important and complex, others straightforward. Some cases may
have witnesses who can more easily access trial testimony and have
a high incentive to do so; in other cases the judge may see at the
outset that out-of-court access is unlikely. Moreover, it is entirely
possible that none of the parties actually want an order to extend
outside the courtroom, as it might be considered unduly intrusive
and unnecessary under the circumstances.345 Arguably, a rule
should not require the court to enter an order controlling out-ofcourt access that the parties find unnecessary and do not want.
There is thus much to be said for leaving the question of out-of-court
access to the experience and discretion of trial judges, after getting
input from the parties, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.346
344. See supra Part IV.A.
345. See Minutes from the Evid. Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 66, at 16-17.
346. The discretionary alternative is the one chosen by the Advisory Committee in the
proposed amendment released for public comment. The text of the proposed amendment is set
forth above. The committee note provides in part as follows:
An order under subdivision (a) operates only to exclude witnesses from the
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B. Automatic Protection Beyond the Courtroom
An amendment to Rule 615 that follows the majority of federal
circuits by automatically extending protections beyond the courtroom would prevent: 1) witnesses from listening to the testimony
given by other witnesses; 2) prospective witnesses from collaborating with one another in advance of testimony; and 3) a witness
who has left the stand from consulting with a prospective witness
or otherwise obtaining trial testimony.347 By expressing the full
scope of a Rule 615 order in the text of the Rule, the amendment
would resolve the notice shortcoming in the existing precedent.348
Witnesses could not credibly complain that they have been caught
unaware by prohibitions on accessing testimony while excluded if
Rule 615 expressly delineates such prohibitions. Such an amended
provision might read:
Rule 615. Excluding Witnesses; Preventing Access to Trial
Testimony by Excluded Witnesses
(a) Court Orders. At a party’s request, the court must, and on
its own may:
(1) order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other
witnesses’ testimony; and
(2) prohibit excluded witnesses from learning about, obtaining, or being provided with trial testimony.
(b) Effect of Order. An order entered pursuant to this Rule
operates to exclude witnesses from the courtroom and to prohibit
courtroom. This includes exclusion of witnesses from a virtual trial. Subdivision
(b) emphasizes that the court may by order extend the sequestration beyond the
courtroom, to prohibit parties subject to the order from disclosing trial testimony
to excluded witnesses, as well as to directly prohibit excluded witnesses from
trying to access trial testimony. Such an extension is often necessary to further
the rule’s policy of preventing tailoring of testimony. The rule gives the court
discretion to determine what requirements, if any, are appropriate in a
particular case to protect against the risk that witnesses excluded from the
courtroom will obtain trial testimony.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, supra note 28, at 306.
347. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1840.
348. See supra Part II.C.
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excluded witnesses from learning about, obtaining, or being
provided with trial testimony. The court may set forth specific
requirements and limitations according to the circumstances of
the case. Or the court may do so on its own. But this rule does
not authorize excluding:
(c) Exceptions from Exclusion. This Rule does not authorize
excluding the following persons from the courtroom:
(a) (1) a party who is a natural person;
(b) (2) an one officer or employee of a party that is not a
natural person, after being designated as the party’s representative by its attorney;
(c) (3) any person persons whose presence a party shows to be
essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense; or
(d) (4) any person persons authorized by statute to be present.

The obvious benefit of extending “automatic” protection against
out-of-court access is that parties will not have to expend litigation
resources seeking protections beyond the courtroom. Should trial
judges continue their longstanding tradition of entering succinct
“Rule 615” or simple “sequestration” orders, this amended provision
automatically affords the full complement of necessary protections
beyond the courtroom door, consistent with the practice of the
majority of federal courts under the existing rule.349 This amendment has the advantage of efficiency by extending the protection out
of court without requiring the parties to request, and the trial judge
to enter, a specific and detailed order in every case.350
But what if a prospective witness should accidently click on a
website that posted trial testimony? Or what if the prosecution,
through an innocent error, placed two trial witnesses in the same
cell during the trial, and they talked about trial testimony?351 These
instances would be in violation of a Rule 615 order under the
automatic rule. This could be a problem, but it does not mean that
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
351. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1175 (1st Cir. 1993).
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anyone will be sanctioned, or that any witness will necessarily be
excluded. Trial courts have substantial discretion to determine the
proper sanction, if any, for violation of a sequestration order under
either amendment alternative.352
It should be noted, though, that calling this an “automatic” rule
is a misnomer. As stated above, every case is different, and so the
trial court may still need to issue an additional order to, for
example, lay out specific limitations on access or use of the internet.
In the typical case, a trial judge may find it necessary only to
admonish all sequestered witnesses generally against accessing
testimony given during their exclusion. But additional safeguards
may be necessary in some factual scenarios. If, for example, the
prosecution in a criminal case planned to have an agent who was
present during trial transport multiple witnesses to and from court,
a trial judge may wish to fashion measures that avoid multiple
witnesses being transported together or that caution the agent
against sharing trial progress during daily transport. A trial court
experimenting with virtual access to trial proceedings could admonish witnesses against accessing proceedings remotely until the
time designated for their testimony.
One concern with an “automatic” rule is that it lacks flexibility.
It requires extension outside the courtroom even if that may not be
necessary in a particular case, and even if the parties do not want
or need the regulation. Essentially the “automatic” rule has the
advantage of efficiency, while the “discretionary” rule has the advantage of flexibility.353
352. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251, 1268-70 (10th Cir. 2011)
(holding that it was harmless error to exclude testimony of a witness due to violation of a
sequestration order when there was no evidence of culpable behavior by defense counsel and
no prejudice was apparent from the violation); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921-23
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that it was plain error to exclude the testimony of a defense witness
who violated a sequestration order when there was no showing that the defense knew about
the violation).
353. As stated above, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules chose the discretionary
provision over the mandatory provision in regulating out-of-court access. See Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments, supra note 28, at 304. Excerpts from the Minutes of the Fall,
2020 Advisory Committee meeting elucidate the Committee’s thinking: “One Committee
member suggested that counsel do not always invoke Rule 615 and may not want sequestration protection at all or at least none beyond the courtroom. For that reason, the Committee
member expressed a preference for the purely discretionary amendment proposal.... The Chair
also noted that parties may not want sequestration orders to extend beyond the courtroom
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Because both of these amendment alternatives would operate
only upon “excluded witnesses,” prohibiting them from learning
about, obtaining, or being provided with trial testimony, they would
not expressly control attorney conduct as does the Maryland version
of Rule 615.354 The Advisory Committee Notes to either of these alternatives should highlight the complex constitutional and ethical
issues surrounding limitations on attorney communication with
prospective witnesses.355 The note could caution courts to be mindful
of these concerns in fashioning appropriate orders governing extratribunal conduct. Last, but not least, both of these options would
also resolve the split of authority regarding designated entity
representatives in favor of a single testifying representative.356
Significantly, sequestration is one of the topics where states have
deviated from their typical practice of adopting the Federal Rules of
Evidence verbatim. Several states have enacted sequestration provisions that differ from Rule 615 in specifying the full complement
of protections they mandate.357 While distinct in some ways, several
state variations expand upon the textual “exclusion” protection
outlined in Rule 615 and specify additional necessary protections
outside the courtroom proper. For example, Maryland’s version of
Rule 615 specifically addresses “[n]ondisclosure,” providing that
“[t]he court may, and upon request of a party shall, order the witness and any other persons present in the courtroom not to disclose
to a witness excluded under this Rule the nature, substance, or
purpose of testimony, exhibits, or other evidence introduced during
the witness’s absence.”358 The Wisconsin counterpart to Rule 615
authorizes a trial judge to “direct that all excluded and non-excluded
witnesses be kept separate until called” and to “prevent them from
communicating with one another until they have been examined or

and that the Rule should not require something the parties do not want.” Minutes from the
Evid. Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 66, at 16-17. Several other members, including the
DOJ representative, agreed with this position. See id. at 17.
354. See MD. R. EVID. 5-615(d)(1) (“A party or an attorney may not disclose to a witness
excluded under this Rule the nature, substance, or purpose of testimony, exhibits, or other
evidence introduced during the witness’s absence.” (emphasis added)).
355. See supra Part III.A.
356. See supra Part IV.
357. See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 5-615(d)(2); N.H. R. EVID. 615(b).
358. MD. R. EVID. 5-615(d)(2).
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the hearing is ended.”359 Louisiana’s Rule 615 requires that the
judge order witnesses to “refrain from discussing the facts of the
case with anyone other than counsel in the case.”360 And New
Hampshire’s equivalent to Rule 615 provides that a sequestration
order “prohibits a sequestered witness ... from discussing the
testimony he or she has given in the proceeding with any other
witness who is subject to sequestration and who has not yet
testified.”361 Similarly, Tennessee’s Rule 615 directs that the “court
shall order all persons not to disclose by any means to excluded
witnesses any live trial testimony or exhibits created in the courtroom by a witness.”362 Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are
intended as a model for state practice, the Rules would benefit from
making improvements to Rule 615 akin to those made successfully
in the state courts.
CONCLUSION
Preventing prospective witnesses from being exposed to trial
testimony is so fundamental to the trial process that it is traditionally referred to as “THE” Rule of Evidence. Its importance to the
accuracy of the truth-seeking process has been uniformly accepted
and uncontroversial since Biblical times. Yet, this bedrock protection against inaccurate trial testimony is imperiled by conflicting
interpretations of Federal Rule of Evidence 615. Circuits that
narrowly construe the Rule in accordance with its plain language
provide no protection against testimonial tailoring outside the
courtroom in the vast majority of cases tried under a succinct
“sequestration” or “Rule 615” order. Circuits that construe such
terse orders broadly to prohibit witness collaboration and communication beyond the trial setting raise concerns about inadequate
notice of proscribed witness behavior.
As demonstrated above, only an amendment to Rule 615 can offer
a workable solution and restore the protection against tailoring to
its intended place of distinction in the trial process. The unavoidable
conflict between the text of Rule 615, which references physical
359.
360.
361.
362.

WIS. STAT. § 906.15(3) (2021).
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 615(A) (2021).
N.H. R. EVID. 615(b), (b)(2).
TENN. R. EVID. 615.
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presence in the courtroom alone, and its clear purpose, to prevent
testimonial tailoring, however accomplished, puts federal courts
interpreting and applying the Rule in an impossible position. An
amendment that provides for expansion of sequestration protection outside the courtroom and provides clear notice to all litigants
of the reach of Rule 615 would provide the optimal solution to the
conflict and confusion plaguing the existing rule. By targeting “witness” behavior specifically, such an amendment could cleverly elide
the difficult constitutional and ethical issues surrounding counsel’s
preparation of witnesses that are beyond the purview of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, leaving them to be sorted appropriately by trial
judges on a case-by-case basis. Finally, amending Rule 615 offers an
opportunity to clarify that entity parties are entitled to designate
only one testifying agent to remain in the courtroom notwithstanding an order of sequestration. This amendment would resolve a split
of authority in favor of a level playing field between natural and
institutional parties, while retaining the trial judge’s discretion to
exempt additional witnesses as “essential” to a party’s presentation.
With these revisions, Rule 615 would embody a complete and effective right of witness sequestration befitting “THE” Rule of Evidence.

